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Abstract
This chapter analyzes the private rationale and the social costs and
benefits of market foreclosure, here defined as a firm’s restriction of out-
put in one market through the use of market power in another market.
The chapter first focuses on vertical foreclosure (in which full access
to a bottleneck input is denied to competitors) and provides an overview
of the theory of access to an essential facility in an unregulated environ-
ment. It considers a wide array of contexts: possibility of bypass of the
bottleneck facility, upstream vs downstream location of this facility, and
various exclusionary activities such as vertical integration and exclusive
dealing. It identifies a number of robust conclusions as to the social and
private costs and benefits of foreclosure.
The chapter then turns to horizontal foreclosure, where the monopoly
good is sold directly to the end-users, and analyzes recent theories of
anti-competitive bundling aimed at reducing competition in the adjacent
markets or at protecting the monopoly market.
Finally, the chapter tackles exclusive customer contracts and dis-
cusses potential efficiency defenses for exclusionary behavior.
Keywords: Essential facility, foreclosure, vertical integration, tie-ins, antitrust.
JEL numbers: D4, K21, L42.
1 Introduction
1.1 What is foreclosure?
This chapter provides a framework for the analysis of the private ra-
tionale as well as the social costs and benefits of market foreclosure.
According to the received definition, foreclosure refers to a dominant
firm’s denial of proper access to an essential good it produces, with the
intent of extending monopoly power from that segment of the market
(the bottleneck segment) to an adjacent segment (the potentially com-
petitive segment). Foreclosure can arise when the bottleneck good is
used as an input (e.g., an infrastructure) by a potentially competitive
downstream industry, or when it is sold directly to customers, who use
the good in conjunction with other, perhaps complementary goods (e.g.,
system goods or aftersale services). In the former case, the firms in the
competitive segment that are denied access to the essential input are said
to be “squeezed” or to be suffering a secondary line injury. In the latter
case, a tie may similarly distort or even eliminate effective competition
from the rivals in the complementary segment.
An input produced by a dominant firm is essential if it cannot be
cheaply duplicated by users who are denied access to it. Examples of
inputs that have been deemed essential by antitrust authorities include a
stadium, a railroad bridge or station, a harbor, a power transmission or
a local telecommunications network, an operating system software and a
computer reservation system.1 The foreclosure or essential facility doc-
trine states that the owner of such an essential facility has an incentive to
monopolize complementary or downstream segments as well. This doc-
trine was first elaborated in the US in Terminal Railroad Association v.
U.S. (1912), in which a coalition of railroad operators formed a joint ven-
ture owning a key bridge across the Mississippi River and the approaches
and terminal in Saint Louis and excluded nonmember competitors. The
Supreme Court ruled that this practice was a violation of the Sherman
Act. A version of the doctrine was invoked by the European Court of
1Extensive legal discussions of foreclosure can be found in Areeda (1981) and,
especially, Hancher (1995).
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Justice in the celebrated United Brands (1978) decision, in which it held
that United Brands Corporation enjoyed substantial market power in
the banana market in Europe and engaged in exclusionary practices in
related markets (distribution, ripening).2
Foreclosure varies in extent. It can be complete, as in the case of a
refusal to deal (equivalently, an extravagant price can serve as “construc-
tive refusal”) or in the case of technical integration between complemen-
tary goods, or partial, as when the bottleneck owner favors some firms or
products in the adjacent market to the detriment of other competitors.
It can also be performed in various ways:
— The bottleneck owner can integrate with one or several firms in the
complementary segment. For example, computer reservations systems
were developed by major airlines. Before the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB)’s 1984 famous decision, it was perceived that smaller airlines, es-
pecially those competing head to head with the integrated firms, had to
pay a high price for access to the reservation systems and received poor
display of their flights on the travel agents’ screens (a key competitive
disadvantage given that most travel agents do not browse much through
screen displays). The CAB attempted to impose equal access in price
and quality to what were perceived to be essential facilities, namely com-
puter reservation systems,3 but did not demand the major airlines’ di-
vestiture of their computer reservation systems. In contrast, in the same
year, US courts forced AT&T to divest its regional operating companies
(known as the RBOCs). Other examples of forced vertical separation
include the UK brewing industry, in which, following an investigation
by the Monopoly and Mergers Commission in 1989, the “majors” were
instructed to divest pubs,4 and the high voltage electricity transmission
2More recently still, the Queensland Wire case (which involved vertical integration
and a vertical price squeeze) is perhaps the first such Australian case in 1989. The
Clear case provides an example of application of the doctrine in New Zealand, in
which the incumbent’s local network is the essential facility.
3Similarly in 1988, the European Commission imposed a fine on Sabena for deny-
ing access to its computer reservation system to the price-cutting airline London
European.
4Snyder (1994) performs an event study analysis of this industry and provides
some evidence of noncompetitive behavior. Slade (1998) however stresses that the
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systems, that have been separated from generation in most countries.
The integrated firm can refuse to deal with potential competitors.
Relatedly, it may make the bottleneck good incompatible with competi-
tors’ products or technologies, or engage in tie-in and refuse to unbundle,
thereby denying access to the essential facility. For example, in Port of
Genoa (1991), the European Court of Justice held that the harbor was
an essential facility and that its use should not be reserved to the under-
taking managing it;5 in the US, Otter Tail Power Co v. United States
(1973) established a duty for a vertically integrated power company to
supply other companies. Famous tie-in cases in the US include Inter-
national Salt (1947), in which the producer of salt dispenser equipment
bundled salt with the equipment, and Chicken Delight (1971), in which
the franchiser tied various inputs (ingredients, cooking equipment) with
the franchising contract. In Europe, the Commission charged IBM in
1980 for abusing its dominant position in CPUs for large mainframe
computers, by tying other elements such as main memory or basic soft-
ware. In Tetra Pak (1994), cartons were tied to the filling machines.
On both sides of the Atlantic, a number of cases have also surfaced in
the context of “after-markets”, when a durable good manufacturer with
market power excludes competitors from providing repairs, maintenance
or spare parts.6
— In the presence of economies of scope or scale calling for cooper-
ation among firms in the same market, a dominant group of firms may
put its competitors at a disadvantage by refusing to cooperate. Famous
cases include Aspen Skying Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skying Co (1985),7
vertical separation led to softer competition. These “beer orders” have been repealed
in 2002.
5A related case is the Sealink decision (1992), where the same company operated
ferry services and controlled the harbor.
6See e.g. in Europe, Hugin v. Commission (1979), in which a manufacturer
refused to supply spare parts for its cash machines and the Commission held that
the manufacturer had a dominant position on its own spare parts. A hotly debated
case in the US is Kodak, who refused to sell replacement parts for photocopiers to
owners unless the latter agreed not to use independent service organizations (see
Borenstein et al. (1995) and Shapiro (1995) for a discussion of this case).
7See e.g. Ahern (1994).
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in which the common owners of three mountains on the site discontinued
the All-Aspen ski passes which enabled skiers to use these mountains as
well a fourth, independently owned, one; and Associated Press v. United
States (1945), in which members of the newspapers’ cooperative could
block membership by competing newspapers. Such cases have obvious
implications for network industries.8
— Short of integration, the bottleneck owner can grant exclusivity to
a subset of firms or tie its essential product with selected products on
the complementary segment, and thus de facto exclude their rivals. For
example, the Court held that the granting of exclusive rights by Auck-
land Regional Authority to Avis and Hertz for operating in the Auckland
airport terminal violated sections 27 and 36 of the New Zealand Com-
merce Act. Similarly, the European Commission has investigated the 65
year contract between Eurotunnel and the incumbent operators, British
Rail and SNCF, allocating the entire capacity available for passenger
and freight rail transport to the two companies.
— Another instrument in the “forecloser”’s toolbox is second-and
third-degree price discrimination. Third-degree discrimination consists
in charging different (cost-adjusted) prices to different customers. It gen-
eralizes exclusivity or tying arrangements by favoring some customers
over the others, but gives the bottleneck owner some flexibility in serv-
ing discriminated-against customers. Even if outright third-degree price
discrimination is prohibited, the bottleneck owner may be able to dupli-
cate it in an apparently anonymous way, that is through second-degree
price discrimination. For example, a loyalty program offered to all or
rebates based on the rate of growth of purchases may target specific cus-
tomers even though they formally are available to all customers. Sim-
ilarly, substantial price discounts may allow the survival of only a few
customers; for instance, a large enough fixed (that is, consumption inde-
pendent) fee transforms a potentially competitive downstream industry
8In Aer Lingus (1992), the European Commission condemned Aer Lingus for
refusing to interline (a technique enabling the marketing of single tickets for combined
flights) with British Midland.
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into a natural monopoly industry. And in the case of complementary
goods, conditional discounts (also known as “mixed bundling”) can al-
low the firm to discriminate de facto among consumers according to
their preferences for the different varieties of products. Such considera-
tions (besides many others) played a role in the process of enacting the
Robinson-Patman Act in the US in 1936.9 There was in particular a
concern that independent wholesalers or retailers might not be able to
compete with powerful chains buying their supplies at favorable prices.
1.2 Remedies
Assuming that the intellectual argument underlying the rationale for
and the detrimental impact of foreclosure is compelling, one must still
design an informationally feasible policy that either reduces the incentive
to exclude or impedes the impact of foreclosure, and verify that the cure
has no strong side-effect.
A number of remedies have been considered by competition law prac-
titioners. While we clearly should not restrict ourselves to the existing
set of policies and should attempt to design better ones, it is useful to re-
view the most prominent ones. It is convenient to group existing policies
into five categories:
— Structural policies. Structural policies such as divestitures and
line of business restrictions are often considered as a last resort, as they
may involve substantial transaction costs of disentangling activities and
may jeopardize the benefits of integration. Yet, in specific instances (as
for the AT&T 1984 divestiture) policy makers may come to the conclu-
sion that it is hard to design proper rules for access to the integrated
bottleneck, and that alternative methods of foreclosure can be prevented
under vertical separation.
Milder forms of vertical separation are sometimes considered; for in-
stance, antitrust authorities may demand that the essential facility be
9Interestingly, in Hoffman La Roche, the European Court of Justice upheld the
Commission’s condemnation of purchasing agreements or loyalty rebates while as-
serting the company’s right to offer volume discounts as long as they are extended
to all customers.
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commonly owned by all users, with the provision that new entrants be
able to purchase shares and membership into the network “at a reason-
able price” (as in the Associated Press case mentioned above). The joint
ownership of an essential facility by competitors must then be granted
an exemption from certain antitrust provisions (as is done for example
for certain types of R&D joint ventures, of cooperatives and of patent
pools).
— Access price control. In the tradition of fully distributed cost reg-
ulation of access in regulated industries, antitrust authorities sometimes
compare the price of access with some measure of its cost. The prin-
ciple of such a comparison was for example accepted by the European
Court of Justice in United Brands (1978), although it did not apply it
in the specific instance. As is well known, the measurement of mar-
ginal cost is a difficult empirical matter, while the allocation of common
costs among product lines has weak theoretical underpinnings. Clearly,
antitrust authorities lack the expertise and staff that is needed for con-
ducting extensive cost studies; at best can one put the onus of proving
overpricing on the excluded competitors, who may well have better cost
information than the authorities.
— Access quantity control. Instead of trying to define the “right”
access price, the authorities sometimes focus on the quantity of access.
For example, following an investigation of the Eurotunnel exclusivity
contract mentioned above, the European Commission asked that 25%
of each operator (British Rail, SNCF)’s capacity be allocated to new
entrants for passenger and freight services.
— Price linkages. Antitrust authorities often try to use other prices
— for access or retail goods — as benchmarks for the access price.
A famous rule, variously called the Efficient Component Pricing Rule
(ECPR), the Baumol-Willig rule, the imputation rule, the parity prin-
ciple, and the nondiscrimination rule, links the integrated monopolist’s
access and retail prices. The idea is to avoid “margin squeezes”, so that
an equally efficient competitor should be able to enter the downstream
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market: the access price charged to competitors should therefore not ex-
ceed the price charged by the integrated firm on the competitive segment,
minus the incremental cost of that firm on the competitive segment. For
example, in the US the Interstate Commerce Commission expressed a
preference for the use of ECPR in railroad disputes.
There are also various forms of mandated linkages between access
charges. The bottleneck firm may be forced to offer the same tariffs
to all users (non-discrimination rules, ban on tying), or even to charge
a single per-unit price. Or, it may be required to charge a price of
access not exceeding its price for the final use of the bottleneck segment
(for example, the access charge for the local telephone network may not
be allowed to exceed the price of local calls for residential or business
consumers).
Last, there may be mandated linkages between several firms’ access
prices, as in the case of reciprocity in access charges for two competing
telecommunications networks (to the extent that each network, regard-
less of its size, enjoys monopoly power on the termination of calls to its
subscribers, each network is an essential facility for the other).
— “Common Carrier” policies. By this expression, we mean the
policy of turning the vertical structure of the industry upside down. It
might appear that in a complementary goods industry, labelling one seg-
ment the “upstream segment” and the other the “downstream segment”
is purely semantic. The analysis of section 2 shows that it is not, be-
cause the downstream firms not only purchase goods (inputs) from the
complementary segment but also are the ones who interact with the fi-
nal consumers. Later, we will ask whether, in presence of differential
competitiveness of the two segments, it is desirable to locate the more
competitive segment upstream or downstream. The relevance of this
question is illustrated (in a regulatory context) by Order 436 which cre-
ated a structure that allows US gas producers to directly sign contracts
with the gas customers (and purchase access from the pipeline bottle-
neck) rather than staying mere suppliers of inputs to pipelines packaging
a bundle of production and transport to final customers.
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— Disclosure requirements. Another tool in the policymaker’s box is
the requirement that contracts for intermediate goods be made public,
with the hope that more “transparency” in supply contracts will promote
downstream competition. Note that transparency is not equivalent to
the prohibition of access price discrimination among buyers. A disclosure
requirement does not preclude different tariffs for different buyers.
1.3 Roadmap
Foreclosure can be defined in different ways. For the purpose of this
survey, we will define foreclosure as a situation in which: (i) a firm dom-
inates one market (bottleneck good); and (ii) it uses its market power in
the bottleneck good market to restrict output in another market, per-
haps but not necessarily by discouraging the entry or encouraging the
exit of rivals. As discussed earlier, we analyze two types of situation:
• Vertical foreclosure may arise when a firm controls an input that
is essential for a potentially competitive industry. The bottleneck
owner can then alter competition by denying or limiting access to
its input.10
• When instead the bottleneck good is not an input but is sold di-
rectly to final users, horizontal foreclosure may arise when the firm
somehow bundles the potentially competitive good and the bottle-
neck good.
With this distinction between vertical and horizontal foreclosure come
two distinct views on exclusionary behavior. Vertical foreclosure is mo-
tivated by the desire to restore a market power that is eroded by a
commitment problem; that is, the exclusionary practice aims at increas-
ing the perpetrator’s profit. By contrast, horizontal foreclosure is an
act of predation; as other predatory behaviors, it reduces the predator’s
10Vertical relations involve many other facets than foreclosure. In the first volume
of the Handbook, Katz (1989) offers for example an overview of the use of verti-
cal restraints to improve vertical coordination and to soften interbrand competition
between rival vertical structures, as well as of the early literature on foreclosure;
and Perry (1989) discusses other motivations for vertical integration, such as price
discrimination, rent extraction or the avoidance of double marginalization.
8
current profit and is meant to lower the competitors’ profitability, with
the ultimate goal of inducing their exit and ultimately recouping the lost
profit.11
We will focus on theories based on the exploitation or protection
of market power. We will not discuss alternative theories of foreclosure
which are based for example on bargaining power,12 price discrimination
(where, say, the complementary and potentially competitive product is
used as a counting device: see, e.g. Bowman (1957)), the avoidance of
“multiprincipal externalities” (Bernheim-Whinston (1986), Martimort
(1996), Segal (1999)), the preservation of industry rents (Comanor and
Rey (2000)),13 or “information-based favoritism” (in which the bottle-
neck segment favors a subsidiary in the procurement of the complemen-
tary good, because it has superior information about the subsidiary or
because it internalizes part of its rent).14
We will also abstract from the closely related access issues in regu-
lated industries.15 In such industries, price controls (and/or explicit or
implicit earnings-sharing schemes)16 often prevent regulated firms from
making money in the bottleneck segment and create incentives for them
11In Europe, a refusal to deal was assessed in Commercial Solvents (1974) from
the point of view of the elimination of competitors; however, starting with United
Brands (1978), the European Court of Justice no longer requires that the refusal to
deal may lead to the competitors’ exit.
The link between tie-ins and predation is discussed in more detail in Tirole (2005).
12On this, see Hart and Tirole (1990) and especially, Bolton and Whinston (1993);
de Fontenay and Gans (2005) revisit the issue using the more flexible multilateral
bargaining developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
13While we will focus on the consequences of the existence of a bottleneck in one
market, Comanor and Rey study some of the implications of multi-stage incumbency.
14There is also an abundant literature on the strategic commitment effect of vertical
arrangements; see e.g. Caillaud and Rey (1995) for a review.
15We refer the reader to existing surveys of the access pricing question: Laffont
and Tirole (2000), Armstrong (2002).
16For example, the firm that is subject to cost-plus regulation in one market and is
unregulated in another, potentially competitive market, has an incentive to allocate
as much as possible of the common and fixed costs to the regulated market, with the
result that entry will be more difficult in the competitive market. More generally,
what matters is the sensitivity of the firm’s profit to cost reductions in the various
markets in which it is active: the firm will wish to “inflate” its costs in the markets
that are subject to cost-based regulation and thus “subsidize” the goods that are
either not regulated or subject to a more “price-cap” oriented regulation; see the
discussion in Section 3.5.2 of Armstrong and Sappington (2003).
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to reap supra-normal returns in the competitive segment, which can only
be achieved by foreclosing access to the bottleneck. For example, the
regulation of access prices may induce the bottleneck owner to delay
interconnection or degrade interconnection quality. Of course, to the
extent that competition policy looks into the regulatory toolbox for pos-
sible remedies, some of the most salient public policies in the regulatory
context are also prominent in the antitrust environment.
Finally, our definition of foreclosure, which involves two distinct mar-
kets, also rules out some exclusionary practices which may prevail within
a single market, such as the use of long-term exclusive dealing arrange-
ments as entry barriers (see Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Rasmusen
et al. (1991)). We will nevertheless discuss the relationship between the
long-term contracting literature and our notion of foreclosure in section
4.
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, it summarizes re-
cent developments in the analysis of foreclosure, and sometimes extends
the existing literature, by considering new modes of competition or by
studying the impact of various forms of competition policy. In so doing,
it develops a critical view of what, we feel, are misguided or insuffi-
cient policy interventions. Second, it builds a preliminary checklist of
exclusionary complaints and bottleneck defenses, which may be useful
for thinking about foreclosure.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on vertical
foreclosure. It first provides an informal overview of the argument, be-
fore developing the conceptual framework and identifying the private
rationale for foreclosure. It also examines the impact of policies such as
nondiscrimination laws and “common carrier” type policies, and applies
the foreclosure argument to an analysis of vertical mergers and exclusive
contracts. Section 3 turns to horizontal foreclosure through tie-ins. After
an informal overview of the main arguments, it first focuses on Whinston
(1990)’s theory of entry deterrence, and then turns to recent develop-
ments relative to the impact of tie-ins on innovation and entry. Section
4 reviews theoretical contributions on exclusionary contracts, while Sec-
tion 5 studies possible defenses for exclusionary behaviors. Section 6
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concludes.17
2 Vertical foreclosure
For all its prominence in competition law, the notion of foreclosure un-
til recently had poor intellectual foundations. Indeed, the intellectual
impetus in the late seventies (reflected in the American antitrust prac-
tice of the eighties) cast serious doubt about its validity. In particular,
the Chicago School, led, in this instance, by Bork (1978) and Posner
(1976), thought that the “leverage” concept resulted from a confusion
about the exercise of monopoly power. It argued that there is a single
source of monopoly profit, and that a bottleneck monopolist can already
earn the entire monopoly profit without extending its market power to
related segments; and so in the absence of efficiency gains, vertical inte-
gration cannot increase the profitability of the merging firms. Relatedly,
it questioned the rationale for excluding downstream competitors, who
by offering product diversity, cost efficiency or simply benchmarking of
the internal downstream producer, can be the source of extra monopoly
profits.
Consider the following quintessential bottleneck situation: An up-
stream monopolist, U , produces a key input for downstream use. There
is potential competition in the downstream segment, but it can emerge
only if competitors have proper access to U ’s essential input. The bottle-
neck owner can therefore alter and even eliminate downstream competi-
tion by favoring one downstream firm — e.g., a downstream affiliate — and
excluding others. According to the foreclosure doctrine, U has indeed an
incentive to do so, in order to extend its monopoly power to the down-
stream segment. However, as pointed out by the Chicago School critique,
in such a situation there is a single final market and therefore only one
profit to be reaped, which U can get by exerting its market power in
the upstream segment; U thus has no incentive to distort downstream
competition — imperfect competition in the downstream market may ac-
tually adversely affect U ’s bargaining power and/or create distortions
17Some of the themes covered in sections 2 and 4 are covered in a more informal
way by Vickers (1996).
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that reduce the profitability of the upstream market.
The Chicago School view has had the beneficial effect of forcing in-
dustrial economists to reconsider the foreclosure argument and to put it
on firmer ground. The reconciliation of the foreclosure doctrine and the
Chicago School critique is based on the observation that an upstream
monopolist in general cannot fully exert its monopoly power without en-
gaging in exclusionary practices. This fact is little acknowledged except
in the specific contexts of patent licensing and of franchising. Consider
for example a patent that covers the unique technology that can be used
in a given productive process. The patentholder is then the owner of
an essential facility (in the economic sense; on the legal front, courts
are unlikely to mandate access, the traditional corollary of the “essen-
tial facility” labelling). Yet the patentholder is unlikely to make much
money if it cannot commit not to flood the market with licenses; for, if
everyone holds a license, intense downstream competition destroys the
profit created by the use of the patent. Therefore, a patentholder would
like to promise to limit the number of licenses. There is however a com-
mitment problem: Once the patentholder has granted n licenses, it is
then tempted to sell further licenses. Such expropriation is ex post prof-
itable for the licensor, but depreciates the value of the first n licenses
and, if anticipated, reduces the patentholder’s ex ante profit. Intellec-
tual Property (IP) law explicitly acknowledges this fact by conferring
entire freedom to contract on the patentholder (except in a set of speci-
fied cases, in which compulsory licensing may be applied by competition
authorities and/or governments to force access to the bottleneck piece
of IP against “proper compensation”). A similar point can be made for
franchising. Franchisees are unlikely to pay much to franchisors if they
do not have the guarantee that competitors will not set up shop at their
doorsteps.
A bottleneck owner faces a commitment problem similar to that of
a durable-good monopolist: Once it has contracted with a downstream
firm for access to its essential facility, it has an incentive to provide access
to other firms as well, even though those firms will compete with the first
one and reduce its profits. This opportunistic behavior ex ante reduces
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the bottleneck owner’s profit (in the example just given, the first firm is
willing to pay and buy less). There is thus a strong analogy with Coase’s
durable good analysis.18 As is well-known, a durable-good monopolist
in general does not make the full monopoly profit because it “creates its
own competition”: By selling more of the durable good at some date, it
depreciates the value of units sold at earlier dates; the prospect of further
sales in turn makes early buyers wary of expropriation and makes them
reluctant to purchase. As we will see, the analogy with the durable-
good model also extends to the means of restoring monopoly power: the
upstream monopolist’s keeping ownership of supplies, exclusive dealing,
retail price floor, reputation of the monopolist not to expropriate, and
so forth.
The licensing and franchising examples mostly involve binary deci-
sions for input transfer (grant or not a license or franchising agreement).
But the commitment problem is very general and extends to situations
in which downstream firms purchase variable amounts of the essential
input. It is then not surprising that the loss of monopoly power associ-
ated with the commitment problem is more severe, the more competi-
tive the downstream segment.19 This proposition has two facets. First,
the upstream bottleneck’s profit is smaller, the larger the number of
downstream firms. Second, for a given number of downstream firms, the
upstream profit is smaller, the more substitutable the downstream units.
Bottlenecks are rarely pure bottlenecks. They most often compete
with inferior goods or services. In the presence of such “bypass opportu-
nities”, an upstream bottleneck owner must face both the commitment
problem and the threat of second sourcing by the downstream firms.
A couple of interesting insights result from this extension of the basic
framework. First, a vertically integrated firm controlling the bottleneck
in general may want to supply a limited but positive amount of the essen-
18See Coase (1972), as well as Tirole (1988, chapter 1) for an overview.
19In a recent debate in France on manufacturer-retailer relationships, some have
advocated that the tough competition observed in the French retail market (which
appears to be tougher than in neighboring countries, and in part due to the presence
of large chains of independent retailers) generates “too much” destructive competition
among their suppliers.
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tial input to the downstream affiliate’s competitors, who would otherwise
purchase the inferior good. The prospect of productive inefficiency cre-
ates scope for profitable external sales by the bottleneck owner. Second,
and relatedly, bypass possibilities create a distinction between two ways
of restoring monopoly power, vertical integration and exclusive dealing.
While exclusive dealing does not enable the bottleneck owner to sup-
ply several downstream firms, vertical integration in contrast provides
enough flexibility to supply nonaffiliates and yet favor the affiliate.
Our analysis has three broad policy implications. First, it does mat-
ter whether the more competitive of two complementary segments lies
upstream or downstream. We show that prices are lower when the bottle-
neck owner lies upstream. This result is robust to the existence of bypass
opportunities, and to the vertical structure of the industry (independent
or vertically integrated bottleneck). Intuitively, an upstream bottleneck
location has two benefits from a social welfare point of view. First, it
creates a commitment problem not encountered by a downstream mo-
nopolist and thus reduces monopoly power. Second, in the presence of
bypass opportunities, an upstream location of the bottleneck prevents
productive inefficiency by creating a stage of competition that elimi-
nates inferior substitutes. Our analysis thus shows that common carrier
policies lower prices and raise production efficiency.
The second policy implication is that nondiscrimination laws may
have the perverse effect of restoring the monopoly power that they are
supposed to fight. When an upstream bottleneck practices foreclosure by
discriminating among competitors, it is tempting to impose a require-
ment that all competitors be offered the same commercial conditions.
Nondiscrimination rules however benefit the upstream bottleneck be-
cause, by forcing it to sell further units at the same high price as the
initial ones, they help the bottleneck commit not to flood the market.
A nondiscrimination law is thus a misguided policy in this situation.20
The third policy implication is that ECPR (which was designed for
a regulated environment, but is also used in antitrust contexts) often
20To better focus on the impact of discrimination on the (in)ability to commit, this
analysis does not account for potentially beneficial effects of bans on discrimination.
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has little bite in unregulated environments. As pointed out by William
Baumol in testimonies, ECPR only provides a link between access and
final prices and is therefore only a partial rule. Moreover, the higher
the final price, the higher the access price can be. In an unregulated
environment, an integrated firm with upstream market power can thus
exercise its market power by setting a high price for the final good and,
at the same time, set a high access charge to prevent other firms in the
competitive segment from becoming effective competitors.
Our analysis has also implications for business strategy. Interestingly,
while the desire to foreclose often motivates vertical integration, it may
alternatively call for divestiture. For example, we develop a rationale for
the 1995 divestiture of AT&T manufacturing arm that is related to the
official justification of this divestiture. With the impending competition
in telecommunications between AT&T and the RBOCs, the latter, who
were major buyers of AT&T equipment, would have been concerned that
the AT&T manufacturing arm would exclude them in order to favor its
telecommunication affiliate.21 The RBOCs might therefore have turned
to alternative manufacturers. We provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions under which this smaller-customer-base effect dominates the fore-
closure effect, and thus divestiture is preferred by the bottleneck owner
to vertical integration.
2.1 A simple framework
As indicated above, when the monopolized market supplies an input used
by a downstream industry, the motivation for foreclosure cannot be the
desire to extend market power, since there is a single final product and
thus a single monopoly profit. Foreclosure can however serve to protect
rather than extend monopoly power. We analyze this rationale using
the simplest framework.
21In the absence of vertical separation, the integrated firm may attempt to create
a level-playing field downstream through other means. A case in point is Nokia’s
creation of Nokia Mobile Software, an independent division separated from the rest
of Nokia by a “Chinese Wall”. This division writes the Nokia Series 60 middleware
platform (running on top of the Symbian operating system) that is used not only by
Nokia’s phone division, but also by a number of its rival mobile makers. See Evans
et al. (2005) for more detail.
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An upstream firm, U, is a monopoly producer of an intermediate
product with marginal cost c. It supplies two undifferentiated down-
stream firms, D1 and D2 (see Figure 1). We will refer to the upstream
segment as the “bottleneck” or “essential facility” segment and to the
downstream segment as the “competitive” segment (although it need
not be perfectly competitive22). The downstream firms transform the
intermediate product into an homogenous final one, on a one-for-one ba-
sis and at zero marginal cost. They compete in the final goods market
characterized by an inverse demand function p = P (q). We will assume
that the demand function is “well-behaved”, in that the profit functions
are (strictly) quasi-concave and that the Cournot game exhibit strate-
gic substitutability.23 Let Qm, pm, and πm denote the whole vertical
structure’s or industry’s monopoly output, price, and profit:
Qm=argmax
q
{(P (q)− c)q},
pm =P (Qm),
πm =(pm − c)Qm.
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22Despite perfect substitutability. The downstream firms may for example compete
à la Cournot (see below); they could alternatively engage in some tacit collusion.
23A sufficient condition for that is P 0 (q) + P 00 (q) q < 0 for all q.
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The interaction between the firms is modelled according to the fol-
lowing timing:
• Stage 1: U offers each Di a tariff Ti(.); Di then orders a quantity
of the intermediate product, qi, and pays Ti(qi) accordingly.
• Stage 2: D1 and D2 transform the intermediate product into the
final good, observe each other’s output and set their prices for the
final good.
This timing depicts a situation in which the supplier produces to order
before the final consumers formulate their demand. The downstream
firms are capacity constrained by their previous orders when they mar-
ket the final product. Alternatively, the transformation activity is suffi-
ciently time consuming that a downstream firm cannot quickly reorder
more intermediate good and transform it if its final demand is unex-
pectedly high, or reduce its order if its final demand is disappointingly
low. In Appendix C, we discuss the case in which final consumers are
patient enough and the production cycle is fast enough that the down-
stream firms produce to order. Technically, the difference between these
two modes of production resembles the distinction between Cournot and
Bertrand competition.
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria. Given the quantities pur-
chased in the first stage, the downstream firms play in the second stage
a standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game of price competition with capac-
ity constraints. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost c is
sufficiently large relative to the downstream marginal cost (zero) that if
the downstream firms have purchased quantities q1 and q2 in the viable
range, they find it optimal to transform all units of intermediate product
into final good and to set their price at P (q1 + q2).24 The second stage
can then be summarized by Cournot revenue functions P (q1 + q2)qi. As
for the first stage, two cases can be distinguished, according to whether
the tariff offered to one downstream firm is observed by the other or not.
24See Tirole (1988, chap. 5) for more detail.
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2.1.1 Commitment, observability and credibility
Let us first consider, as a benchmark, the case where both tariffs offered
by U are observed by both D1 and D2. In that case, U can fully exert its
market power and get the entire monopoly profit (see for example Math-
ewson and Winter (1984) and Perry and Porter (1989)). For example,
U can achieve this result by offering (qi, Ti) = (Qm/2, pmQm/2):25 both
D1 and D2 accept this contract and together sell the monopoly quantity,
Qm, at the monopoly price pm.26 In this world, there is no rationale for
foreclosure. The upstream monopolist can preserve its monopoly power
without excluding one of the competitors.
Sticking to those contracts, however, is not credible if the contracts
are secret or can be privately renegotiated. Suppose for example that U
and D2 have agreed to q2 = Qm/2 (and T2 = pmQm/2); U and D1 would
then have an incentive to agree to the quantity, q1, that maximizes their
joint profit, i.e.:
q1=argmax
q
{[P (Qm/2 + q)− c]q}
=RC(Qm/2)
>Qm/2 ,
where RC denotes the standard Cournot reaction function, and the
last inequality derives from a standard revealed preference argument.27
Hence, U has an incentive to secretly convince D1 to buy more than
25Since U has perfect information on D1 and D2 it can actually dictate their
quantity choices -subject to their participation constraint- via adequately designed
tariffs of the form “(qi, Ti)”: T (q) = Ti if q = qi and +∞ otherwise. Since U moreover
makes take-it-or-leave-it offers, it can set Ti so as to extract Di’s entire profit.
26Although downstream firms are symmetric, an asymmetric allocation of the
monopoly output between them would do as well. The symmetric allocation is how-
ever strictly optimal when downstream cost functions are (symmetric and) strictly
convex.
27The first-order conditions for q ≡ Qm/2 and qˆ ≡ RC(Qm/2) are respectively
P (2q) − c + 2qP 0 (2q) = 0 and P (q + qˆ) − c + qˆP 0 (q + qˆ) = 0; since P 0 < 0, they
cannot coincide for qˆ = q, and thus qˆ 6= q. From a revealed preference argument,
[P (q + q)− c] (q + q)≥ [P (q + qˆ)− c] (q + qˆ) ,
[P (q + qˆ)− c] qˆ ≥ [P (q + q)− c] q,
implying P (q + q) ≥ P (q + qˆ), and thus (since qˆ 6= q), qˆ > q.
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Qm/2. Anticipating this, firm D2 would turn down the monopolist’s
offer.
2.1.2 Secret contracts
From now on, we consider the game in which in the first stage, U offers
secret contracts (that is, Di observes the contract it is offered, but not
the contract offered to Dj). In this game, U is subject to the temptation
just described and thus faces a credibility problem. The contracts offered
by U in equilibrium, as well as the responses from D1 and D2, depend
on the nature of each downstream firm’s conjectures about the contract
offered to its rival. Since there is considerable leeway in specifying those
beliefs, there are many perfect Bayesian equilibria: but, as we will see,
one equilibrium stands out as the only plausible one in this context and
we will therefore focus on this equilibrium.
To illustrate the role of conjectures, suppose that D1 and D2 assume
that U makes the same offer (even unexpected ones) to both of them.
Then it is credible for U to offer (q1, T1) = (q2, T2) = (Qm/2, pmQm/2) :
Expecting that any offer it receives is also made to its rival, Di refuses to
pay more than P (2q)q for any quantity q; U thus maximizes (P (2q)−c)2q
and chooses q = Qm/2. Hence, under such a symmetry assumption on
the downstream firms’ conjectures, U does not suffer from any lack of
credibility.
This symmetry assumption, which concerns unexpected offers (i.e.,
out-of-equilibrium ones) as well as expected ones, is however not very
appealing. When the supplier supplies to order, it is more plausible
to assume that, when a firm receives an unexpected offer it does not
revise its beliefs about the offer made to its rival. Secrecy together with
upstream production on order implies that, from the point of view of the
upstream monopolist, D1 and D2 form two completely separate markets
(of course, D1 and D2 themselves perceive a strong interdependency).
Thus the monopolist has no incentive to change its offer to Dj when it
alters Di’s contract. Such conjectures are called passive or market-by-
market-bargaining conjectures.28
28Conjectures can be passive only if the downstream units have perfect informa-
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Under passive conjectures, Di , regardless of the contract offer it re-
ceives from U , expectsDj to produce the candidate equilibrium quantity,
qj, and is thus willing to pay up to P (q + qj)q for any given quantity q.
U , who extracts all of Di’s expected profit by making a take-it-or-leave-
it offer, offers to supply qi so as to maximize the joint profit in their
bilateral relationship, namely:
qi=argmax
q
{(P (q + qj)− c)q}
≡RC(qj).
Hence, under passive conjectures the equilibrium is unique and char-
acterized by the Cournot quantities, price and profits:
q1= q2 = qC where qC = RC(qC) > Qm/2 ,
p1= p2 = pC = P (2qC) < pm ,
πU =(pC − c)2qC = 2πC < πm,
πD1 =πD2 = 0.
This result, due to Hart and Tirole (1990), and further analyzed by
O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994), highlights
the commitment problem faced by the supplier. Even though it is in
a monopoly position, its inability to credibly commit itself gives room
for opportunistic behavior and prevents it from achieving the monopoly
outcome.
As already mentioned, this outcome is closely related to the phe-
nomenon underlying the Coasian conjecture on the pricing policy of a
tion about the bottleneck’s marginal cost; for, assume that the bottleneck has private
information about this marginal cost. The tariff offered to D1, say, then signals in-
formation about the marginal cost; for example, a two-part tariff with a low marginal
price may reveal a low marginal cost and therefore signal that D2 is also offered a
tariff with a low marginal cost and will produce a high quantity.
Thus, when the bottleneck has private information about its marginal cost, the
downstream firms’ conjectures can no longer be “passive”. But they may still reflect
the fact that the bottleneck bargains “market-by-market”, that is attempts to max-
imize its profit in any given intermediate market (where an “intermediate market”
corresponds to a Di) without internalizing the impact of the contract on the other
market, since its profits in the two markets are unrelated. A lack of transparency of
the bottleneck’s cost may nevertheless improve the bottleneck’s commitment ability.
The Coase problem with incomplete information about the bottleneck’s cost function
is developed in White (2000).
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durable good monopolist. If the monopolist can commit to future prices,
it can obtain the monopoly profit by committing itself to never set its
price below the monopoly level. However, once all monopoly sales have
taken place (in the first period), it has an incentive to lower its price and
exploit the residual demand. If the monopolist cannot commit itself on
its future pricing policy, the buyers then delay their purchase in order
to benefit from lower future prices, and the profit is reduced.
Suppose more generally that there are n identical downstream com-
petitors. Then, by the same argument, the passive conjectures equilib-
rium is symmetric and satisfies
q = RC((n− 1)q),
where q is the output per downstream firm. Thus, the commitment prob-
lem becomes more severe, the larger the number of downstream firms.
Indeed, the retail price on the competitive segment tends to marginal
cost c and the industry profit tends to zero as the number of firms tends
to infinity. Thus, we would expect bottleneck owners to be keener to
foreclose access to the essential facility, the more competitive the down-
stream industry. The analogy with the durable good model again is
obvious. There, the monopolist’s commitment problem increases with
the number of periods of sales. Indeed, and this is Coase’s famous con-
jecture, the monopolist’s profit vanishes as opportunities to revise prices
become more and more frequent.29
Adding downstream firms is one way of increasing the intensity of
downstream competition. Another relevant impact of competition on
the extent of the commitment problem is obtained by varying the de-
gree of downstream product differentiation. Let us, for the sake of this
exercise only, depart from the perfect substitutes assumption and al-
low the two downstream firms to produce differentiated products. Un-
der our assumptions, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with capacities
q1 and q2 yields retail prices p1 = P1(q1, q2) and p2 = P2(q2, q1). The
29Caprice (2005a) shows that this effect is mitigated when the upstream domi-
nant firm competes with an alternative supplier. In that case, while an increase in
the number of downstream firms still decreases industry profits, it also allows the
dominant supplier to get a bigger share of this smaller pie.
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equilibrium of the overall game is still the Cournot equilibrium of the
simpler game in which the downstream firms face marginal cost c. If,
as we would normally expect, the ratio of Cournot industry profit over
monopoly profit increases with the degree of differentiation, the incen-
tive to restore monopoly power is stronger, the more substitutable the
downstream products.
• Restoring monopoly power. In contrast with conventional wisdom,
foreclosure here aims at reestablishing rather than extending market
power: In order to exert its market power the upstream monopolist has
an incentive to alter the structure of the downstream market. For ex-
ample, excluding all downstream firms but one eliminates the “Coasian
pricing” problem and restores U ’s ability to sustain the monopoly price;
exclusive dealing , which de facto monopolizes the downstream market,
thus allows U to exert more fully its upstream market power. [We define
here exclusive dealing as an upstream firm’s commitment not to deal
with alternative downstream firms. Examples include exclusive license
or franchise contracts.]
Alternatively, U may want to integrate downwards with one of the
downstream firms, in order to eliminate the temptation of opportunism
and credibly commit itself to reduce supplies to downstream firms.30 For,
suppose that the upstream firm internalizes the profit of its downstream
affiliate, and that it supplies the monopoly quantity Qm to this affiliate
and denies access to the bottleneck good to nonintegrated downstream
firms. The integrated firm then receives the monopoly profit πm. Any
deviation to supply nonintegrated producers can only result in a lower
industry profit, and therefore in a lower profit for the integrated firm.
The bottleneck monopolist may conceive still other ways of preserv-
ing the monopoly profit. For instance, as noted by O’Brien and Shaffer
30Again, there is an analogy with Coase’s durable good model. A standard way for
a durable-good monopolist of restoring commitment power is to refrain from selling.
A durable-good monopolist who leases the good assumes ownership of existing units
and thus is not tempted to expropriate the owners of previous production by flooding
the market (it would expropriate itself), in the same way the integrated bottleneck
owner is not tempted to expropriate its affiliate by supplying other downstream firms.
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(1992), a market-wide resale price maintenance (RPM), in the form of
a price floor, together with a return option31 would obviously solve the
commitment problem; O’Brien and Shaffer further show that squeez-
ing downstream margins through individual price ceilings can also help
eliminate the scope for opportunism. Alternatively, allowing tariffs to be
contingent on both firms’ outputs is another such instrument: A contract
of the form “qi = Qm/2, Ti = pmQm/2, together with a hefty penalty
paid by the supplier to the buyer if the buyer’s competitor is delivered
a higher quantity of the intermediate good, and thus produces a higher
quantity of the final good” solves the opportunism problem.32
Recalling the various ways in which a durable-good monopolist can
restore its commitment power33 suggests several other commitment poli-
cies for the bottleneck owner. In an oft repeated relationship, the bottle-
neck owner may build a reputation with D1, say, for practicing “implicit
exclusive dealing”. That is, the bottleneck owner may sacrifice short-
term profit by not supplyingD2 in order to build a reputation and extract
31The possibility for downstream units to return the wares at the marginal whole-
sale price is in general needed for obtaining the monopoly solution. Suppose that
c = 0, and that when both sellers charge the same price but supply more than the
demand at this price, the rationing follows a proportional rule (so, sellers sell an
amount proportional to what they bring to the market). Let the upstream firm sup-
ply qm/2 to each downstream firm and impose price floor pm. Then the upstream
firm can supply some more units at a low incremental price to one of the sellers, thus
expropriating the other seller.
Relatedly, McAfee and Schwartz (1994) consider Most-Favored-Customer (MFC)
clauses. They allow downstream firms who have accepted a “first-stage” individu-
alized contract offer to replace it in a “second stage” (that is, before downstream
product market competition) by any offer made to any other downstream firm. They
show that such MFC clauses do not quite solve the monopolist’s commitment prob-
lem. By contrast, De Graba (1996) shows that, by offering two-part tariffs and by
allowing downstream firms to apply the MFC term-by-term (that is, to choose the
contract (min {Fi} ,min {wi}), where min {Fi} is the minimum of the fixed fees and
min {wi} is the minimum of the wholesale unit prices offered in the first stage), the
monopolist restores its commitment power and is able to achieve the monopoly profit.
32In a smoother vein, the upstream monopolist could mimic vertical integration
with contracts that capture all realized downstream profits, e.g., tariffs Ti(qi, qj) =
P (qi + qj)qi that charge Di according to the level of input delivered to Di and Dj
— a small discount for the particular choice qi = Qm/2 might help downstream firms
to coordinate on the desired outcome — or contracts based on downstream revenues,
if observable, rather than input — a contract of the form “give back (almost) all of
your revenue” also eliminates the risk of opportunistic behavior.
33On this, see Tirole (1988, pp. 84—86).
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high payments from D1 in the future, in the same way a durable-good
monopolist may gain by refraining from flooding the market. In another
analogy with the durable-good model, the bottleneck owner gains from
facing a (publicly observed) tight capacity constraint (or more generally
from producing under decreasing returns to scale). The downstream
firms are then somewhat protected against expropriation by the capac-
ity constraint.34 Some of these analogies with the durable-good model
are listed in Table 1.
EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR ANALOGUE FOR THE
DURABLE-GOOD MONOPOLIST
Exclusive dealing Destruction of production unit
Profit sharing / Leasing
vertical integration
Retail price floor Most favored nation clause
Reputation for implicit Reputation for not
exclusive dealing flooding the market
Limitation of Limitation of
productive capacity productive capacity
Table 1
2.1.3 Empirical evidence
a) Experimental evidence
34Alternatively, the upstream firm benefits if the downstream firms face capacity
constraints.
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Martin et al. (2001) test this theory of foreclosure (with an upstream
monopolist and a downstream duopoly) using experimental techniques.
They compare three possible games: non-integration with public or se-
cret offers and vertical integration. The first and the third, according to
the theory, should yield the monopoly outcome, while the second should
result in the Cournot outcome.
Martin et al. find only partial support for the theory. The monop-
olist’s commitment problem is apparent in the data: total output and
profit are similar and close to the monopoly level in the first and third
games; by contrast, output is often, although not always, significantly
higher and profit lower in the second game. But in addition, integration
allows more surplus to be extracted from the unintegrated downstream
firm, suggesting that bargaining effects play also a role. Under vertical
integration, in the majority of cases the integrated player gets all the
profit, as the theory predicts; downstream firms thus accept to get only
a small profit, contrasting with other experiments in which players tend
to reciprocate (retaliate) by wasting value when they are offered a small
share of the pie.35 In the nonintegrated treatments, the industry profits
are instead more evenly shared between the upstream monopolist and
downstream firms.
Relatedly, Martin et al. indirectly investigate the nature of out-of-
equilibrium beliefs under secret offers, by looking at downstream ac-
ceptance decisions as functions of the contract offer. They find that
these beliefs are highly heterogeneous, and on the whole somewhere in
between passive and symmetric beliefs. (Note, incidentally, that, as in
other experiments, the rational behavior of a “rational player” does not
coincide with the rational behavior under common knowledge of ratio-
nality. In particular, deviations by the upstream monopolist may signal
some irrationality and it is not longer clear that passive conjectures are
as rational as they are under common knowledge of rationality.)
b) Field studies
35See, however, Roth et al. (1991) on the lack of fairness concerns in competitive
environments.
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Alternatively, one can look at the impact of vertical mergers on down-
stream rivals and end users. According to the foreclosure theory reviewed
above, vertical integration may help upstream bottlenecks solve their
commitment problem.36 (At least) three implications may be tested:
a) downstream rivals (D2) receive less input from or pay a higher price
to the upstream firm with market power (U), or more generally
discrimination between D1 and D2 tilts market shares in the favor
of D1;
b) if D2 is publicly traded, then D2’s stock price goes down when the
merger is announced.37
c) the final customers suffer from the merger. Their decrease in wel-
fare can be measured in (at least) two ways:
— a decrease of their stock price if they are publicly listed,
— an increase in the futures price if there is a future market for
the final good.
As usual, the potential anti-competitive effects need to be traded off
against potential benefits of vertical integration (such as the encourage-
ment of investment in specific aspects), and more generally the various
social benefits that are invoked in favor of a more lenient attitude of
antitrust authorities toward market foreclosure (see section 5).
Nor are individual tests perfect evidence of foreclosure effects. Test a)
(the destruction of the level-playing field betweenD1 andD2), if positive,
may be alternatively interpreted through a standard monopoly pricing
36We are not aware of any empirical study testing another implication of foreclosure
theory, namely that “turning an industry upside down” by mandating access to
bottlenecks may make it more competitive (see below the discussion of the US gas
industry). This implication might be tested for example in the railroad or airline
industries.
37This is not strictly the case in the model above, because U is assumed to extract
the entire rents of the downstream units, and thus D2’s stock price does not react
to the merger U −D1. Relaxing this extreme assumption, e.g. by conferring some
bargaining power on the downstream firms or by introducting private information
about the latter’s costs (so as to generate downtream rents), yields implication b).
26
story, and might be positive even if D1 and D2 did not compete in the
same product market (in which case foreclosure could not be a motive
for vertical integration): When U has asymmetric information about D1
and D2’s technology and profit, U may charge wholesale prices largely
above its marginal cost because a fixed fee then does not suffice to handle
the allocation of the downstream firm’s rent. By contrast, if D1’s profit
accrues to U , then U has an incentive to charge an internal marginal
transfer price to D1, regardless of whether D1 and D2 compete in the
product market.38
Test b) is subject to the potential criticism that specific increases in
the merged entity’s efficiency may hurt downstream rivals even in the
absence of foreclosure intent. Namely, a merger that, say, encourages
specific investments and reduces D1’s marginal cost makes D1 a fiercer
rival in the downstream product market. By contrast, mergers whose
efficiency gains result from a reduction in fixed costs would have no such
effect.
Test c) is subject to the caveat that pre-merger stock or futures
prices reflect market anticipations. Therefore, the evolution of such a
price at the time of the merger depends on the impact of that particular
merger, but also on what alternative scenario was anticipated as well.
For example, if U was a potential entrant in the downstream market and
decides instead to acquire one of the existing competitors, then market
indicators may react negatively to the merger even in the absence of any
foreclosure concern.39
We are aware of few empirical studies of modern foreclosure theory.
Needless to say, this is an area that would deserve further investigations.
Chipty (2001) considers implication a) in the cable industry, and shows
38While a vertical merger would thus generate discrimination between the inte-
grated and non-integrated downstream firms, this would occur through a modifica-
tion of the contract with the integrated subsidiary, while foreclosure motives would
also involve a modification of the terms offered to the non-integrated firms. Thus, in
principle, one might be able to distinguish the two types of motivations.
39Fridolfsson and Stennek (2003) stress a similar point in the context of horizontal
mergers. When a merger is announced, the share prices of formerly potential targets
and acquirers are reduced, since they are now out of play. Anti-competitive mergers
may thus reduce competitors’ share prices, despite increasing their profits; as a result
event studies may not detect the competitive effects of mergers.
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that integrated cable operators exclude rival channels. Snyder (1994,
1995a,b) takes route b), and conducts event studies looking at down-
stream rivals’ stock market price reaction to various public announce-
ments of a merger or of antitrust authorities’s steps to undo existing
mergers. His study of the vertical integration of beer manufacturers and
pubs in the UK (1994, 1995a) looks at the reaction of the stock price of
Guinness (then the only publicly listed nonintegrated major beer pro-
ducer) to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission’s successive moves
during its investigation of foreclosure in the brewing industry. He docu-
ments a positive reaction of Guinness’s stock price to the MMC’s and the
government’s anti-integration moves. His study of vertical integration
of upstream crude oil production and downstream refining in the US oil
industry (1995a,b) delivers a small effect (negative impact of integration
decision on rivals’ stock price in event studies). Mullin and Mullin’s
(1997) study US Steel’s 1905-1906 “acquisition”40 of a huge amount of
low-extraction-cost iron ore properties on the Western Mesabi Range.
Mullin and Mullin follow, inter alia, route c), by measuring the event-
study impact of the merger on the largest net consumers of iron and steel
(railroads); they argue that the merger turned out to benefit these final
consumers, suggesting that vertical integration was motivated by effi-
ciency considerations (on which they bring another form of evidence).41
2.1.4 Policy implications
The previous subsection has presented the basic motivation for foreclo-
sure and stressed the strong analogy with the Coasian pricing problem.
We now derive some policy implications.
Upstream versus downstream bottlenecks The “Coasian pricing
problem” is more likely to arise when bottlenecks are at more upstream
levels, that is, when they have to supply (competing) intermediaries to
reach final consumers. To see this, consider the more general framework,
40More properly, the signing of a long-term lease giving US Steel the exclusive right
to mine.
41Riordan (1998) however questions their conclusions. In particular, he argues that
incumbent railroads might well have benefitted from rising steel prices, which would
have limited entry and expansion plans.
28
where two complementary goods, A and B, must be combined together
to form the final good (on a one-to-one basis: one unit of good A plus
one unit of good B produces one unit of the final good), good A being
produced by a monopolistM (at constant marginal cost c) whereas good
B is produced by two competing firms C1 and C2 (at no cost).42 In the
case of telecommunications, for example, good A may correspond to the
local fixed link segment and good B to the long distance segment. To
stick to the previous framework, we denote by p = P (q) the inverse
demand for the final good.
The case where M is “upstream” (Figure 2a) is formally equivalent
to the one analyzed above: M sells good A to C1 and C2, who combine it
with good B to provide consumers with the final good. If M can make
secret offers to both C1 and C2, then opportunism prevents M from
fully exerting its monopoly power. The upstream monopolist obtains
the Cournot profit.
If instead M is “downstream” (that is, C1 and C2 supply M , who
then deals directly with consumers, as in Figure 2b), the situation is
different: Being at the interface with consumers, M is naturally inclined
to “internalize” any negative externality between C1 and C2, and is thus
induced to maintain monopoly prices. AssumingM can still make take-
it-or-leave-it offers to both C1 and C2, M can now at the same time
extract all profits from them and charge the monopoly price to final
consumers.43 Hence, from either the consumers’ or total welfare perspec-
tive, it is preferable to put the more competitive segment downstream.
42We use the generic notation {M,C1, C2} when the location is endogenous — as
here — or irrelevant — as in the horizontal foreclosure case studied in section 3 —, and
the specific one {U,D1,D2} for fixed vertical structures — such as studied previously.
43Does this result depend on the assumption that the monopolist has all the bar-
gaining power? Consider for example the opposite extreme: The upstream com-
petitors make take-it-or-leave-it contract offers Ti(qi) to the downstream monopolist.
This situation has been analyzed in depth by the literature on “supply functions
equilibria” (e.g., Back and Zender (1993), Bernheim and Whinston (1986, 1998),
Green and Newbery (1992), and Klemperer and Meyer (1989)). As is well-known,
supply function games have multiple equilibria (see e.g. Back and Zender (1993) and
Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). On the other hand, it is possible to select among
differentiable equilibria by introducing enough uncertainty (Klemperer and Meyer
(1989)). This selection yields the same Bertrand competition outcome (Ti(qi) = 0
for all qi) as for the polar distribution of bargaining powers.
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For example, in the above mentioned telecommunications example, it is
preferable to let consumers deal directly with the competing long dis-
tance operators who then buy access from the fixed link operator. This
idea may provide a rationale for the U.S. gas reform (FERC order 436,
1985)44 and the “common carrier” concept, although some caution must
be exerted in view of the regulatory constraints in those industries.
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Non-discrimination laws Non-discrimination laws are often moti-
vated by the protection of final consumers against abuses of a dominant
position. It is well-known that in other contexts non-discrimination laws
may have ambiguous effects, since they may favor some consumers to
the detriment of others. But in the context described above, these laws
adversely affect all consumers and total welfare: they eliminate oppor-
tunistic behavior and allow the bottleneck owner to fully exercise its
monopoly power.45
44Before the reform, pipelines (the bottleneck) sold gas to customers (distribution
companies, large industrial customers) and purchased their gas internally or from
independent producers who had no direct access to customers. Since the reform,
producers can purchase access from pipelines and intereact directly with customers.
45O’Brien and Shaffer (1994) already made this point in the context of Bertrand
downstream competition. Caprice (2005b) notes that restoring commitment by ban-
ning price discrimination is not necessarily undesirable when there is an alternative
supplier, since the dominant supplier may then want to commit to lower wholesale
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To see this, return to the basic (Cournot) framework in which the
monopolist is located upstream, and assume that U is restricted to offer
the same tariff to both D1 and D2:46
• Stage 1: U offers the same tariff T (·) to both D1 and D2; Di
then orders a quantity of intermediate product, qi and pays T (qi)
accordingly.
• Stage 2: D1 and D2 transform the intermediate product into final
good, observe each other’s output and set their prices for the final
good.
This game is played under complete information at each point of time.
Thus there is no scope for opportunistic behavior from U. Formally, the
situation is the same as with secret offers but “symmetric” beliefs, and
in equilibrium U gets the entire monopoly profit. An example of an
optimal tariff is T (q) = F +wq, where the fixed fee F and the wholesale
price w satisfy:
qC(w) = Qm/2
F = (pm − w)Qm/2,
where qC(w) denotes the Cournot equilibrium quantity (per firm) when
firms’ unit cost is w :
qC(w) = qˆ such that qˆ = argmax
q
{(P (q + qˆ)− w)q}.
In other words, the marginal transfer price w is set so as to lead
to the desired monopoly price and quantities, and F is used to extract
Di’s profit. Hence, if the upstream firm cannot discriminate between
the two downstream firms (but can still offer a non-linear tariff, or at
least require a —uniform— franchise fee), it can fully exert its market
power and maintain the monopoly price: Non-discrimination laws here
prices — see the discussion in footnote 51.
46This supposes some degree of ex post transparency; yet, in the absence of a ban
on discrimination, there would still scope for opportunism if the downstream firms
must sign their own contracts before observing the terms offered to the rivals.
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reduce consumer surplus and total welfare by enabling the monopolist
to commit.
To obtain the monopoly profit, the upstream monopoly can alterna-
tively offer the following nondiscriminatory two-part tariff:
T (qi) = πm + cqi.
That is, the wholesale price is equal to marginal cost and the fixed fee
equal to the monopoly profit. It is then an equilibrium for D1 to sign an
agreement and for D2 to turn it down.47 The competitive sector then
makes no profit, and the upstream monopolist obtains the full monopoly
profit by monopolizing the downstream sector. Note that the fixed fee
de facto transforms a potentially competitive downstream industry into
a natural monopoly (increasing returns to scale) industry. Price dis-
counts, an instance of second-degree price discrimination, are here a
perfect substitute for the prohibited third-degree price discrimination.
It is also interesting to note that such foreclosure ideas partly underlied
the rationale for the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act in the US, although
considerations such as differential access to backward integration (not
to mention intense lobbying) were relevant as well.48
2.2 Restoring monopoly power: vertical integra-
tion
As we observed, vertical integration helps the upstream monopolist U to
circumvent its commitment problem and to (credibly) maintain monopoly
prices. Suppose that U integrates withD1 as in Figure 3b. The upstream
47To be certain, there is a coordination problem here. But this problem is readily
solved if U contacts one of the downstream firms first.
48If U is restricted to use linear prices, then the outcome is even worse for con-
sumers and economic welfare, as well as for the monopolist, who still can commit
but cannot prevent double marginalization.
Formally, when the above game is modified by restricting the tariff T (·) to be
of the form T (q) = wq, U sets w so as to maximize ΠU ≡ (w (Q) − c)Q, where
w(Q) ≡ (qC)−1(Q/2) satisfies, from the downstream first-order conditions: w (Q) =
P (Q) + P 0 (Q)Q/2. Hence, Π0U = P − c + P 0Q + (2P 0 + P 00Q)Q/2 is negative for
Q = Qm, since the sum of the first three terms is then equal to zero and the term in
bracket is then negative. Therefore, U “picks” a total quantity Q < Qm whenever its
objective function is quasi-concave. This reflects the fact that U does not take into
account the impact of a decrease of output on the downstream firms’ profits.
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monopolist, if it receives D1’s profit, internalizes the impact of sales to
D2 on the profitability of units supplied to its subsidiary. Consequently,
the “expropriation” problem disappears and U restricts supplies to D2
as is consistent with the exercise of market power. We first analyze in
detail the foreclosure effect of vertical integration under the possibility
of bypass and then derive some policy implications.
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2.2.1 Vertical integration and bypass of the bottleneck seg-
ment
In the simple framework above, vertical integration leads to the com-
plete exclusion of the nonintegrated downstream firm. This is clearly an
extreme consequence, driven in particular by the absence of alternative
potential supplier for D2. We show however that the same logic holds,
even when there exists a competing but less efficient second source for
D2.49 The new feature is then that the vertically integrated firm may
supply its competitor on the downstream segment, a sometimes realistic
outcome.
We generalize the model by introducing a second supplier, Uˆ , with
49Here the other upstream firm produces a substitute. An interesting topic for
future research would look at a bottleneck consisting of complementary goods pro-
duced by different upstream suppliers. Amelia Fletcher suggested to us that a joint-
marketing agreement (for example through the formation of a patent pool without
independent licensing) might reduce welfare, despite the fact that the goods are
complements, if it inhibits secret price discounts by creating protracted negotiations
between upstream firms.
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higher unit cost50 cˆ > c. The timing is now as follows:
• Stage 1: U and Uˆ both secretly offer each Di a tariff, Ti(·) and
Tˆi(·); each Di then orders a quantity of intermediate product to
each supplier, qi and qˆi, and pays Ti(qi), Tˆi(qˆi), accordingly.
• Stage 2: D1 and D2 transform the intermediate product into final
good, observe each other’s output and set their prices for the final
good.
In the absence of integration (Figure 4a), U , being more efficient,
ends up supplying both D1 and D2, although under conditions that are
more favorable to downstream units (lower fixed fees) than before, due
to the potential competition from Uˆ .More precisely (see Hart and Tirole
(1990) for a formal proof), U supplies, as before, qC to both downstream
firms, but for a payment equal to πC−maxq
©¡
P
¡
q + qC
¢
− cˆ
¢
q
ª
, since
each downstream firm can alternatively buy from Uˆ , who is willing to
supply them at any price pˆ ≥ cˆ. That is, the introduction of the alter-
native supplier does not affect final prices and quantities or the organi-
zation of production, but it alters the split of the profit between U and
the downstream firms.51
50We assume that the suppliers’ costs are known. Hart and Tirole (1990) allow
more generally the costs to be drawn from (possibly asymmetric) distributions. They
show that U has more incentive to integrate vertically than Uˆ if realizations of c are
statistically lower than those of cˆ, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
51Interestingly, this may not be true in the case of public contracts. In the ab-
sence of Uˆ , U could for example maintain the monopoly outcome by offering both
firms (qi = Qm/2, Ti = πm/2). When Uˆ is present, U could try to maintain the
monopoly outcome (qi = Qm/2) and simply reduce the price to πm/2 − πˆ, where
πˆ = max {[P (Qm/2 + q)− cˆ] q}. However, if Uˆ is not too inefficient, namely, if
Qˆm = max {[P (q)− cˆ] q} > Qm/2, Uˆ would destroy this candidate equilibrium by
offering Qˆm to one downstream firm, at a lump-sum price between πˆ and πˆm: that
downstream firm would accept this contract, thereby discouraging the other firm
from accepting U ’s offer. The analysis of competition in public contracts can actu-
ally be surprisingly complex — see Rey and Vergé (2002). Even when the alternative
supply comes from a competitive fringe that does not behave strategically, the domi-
nant manufacturer may deviate from joint profit maximization, e.g. by offering lower
input prices, in order to reduce the rents obtained by the downtream firms — see
Caprice (2005b), who notes that banning price discrimination may be a good idea
in that case, since doing so may allow the dominant manufacturer to commit itself
to low prices; this effect disappears, however, when contracts can be contingent on
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If U and D1 integrate (Figure 4b), however, they again have an in-
centive to restrict supplies to D2 as much as possible; however, D2 can
turn to Uˆ and buy RˆC(q1) ≡ argmaxq{[P (q+q1)− cˆ]q}. Consequently, in
equilibrium U still supplies both downstream firms (and Uˆ does not sell),
but the equilibrium quantities {qC1 , qC2 } correspond to the “asymmetric”
Cournot duopoly with costs c and cˆ, characterized by:
qC1 = R
C(qC2 ) and q
C
2 = Rˆ
C(qC1 ),
where RˆC(q1) ≡ argmax
q
{[(P (q + q1)− cˆ]q}.
Hence, vertical integration between U and D1 still leads to a reduc-
tion in the supply to D2, who now faces a higher opportunity cost (cˆ
instead of c). This new configuration entails a reduction of aggregate
production as −1 < RC0(q) < 0 and RˆC(q) < RC(q) imply 2qC < qC1 +qC2
(see Figure 5); although q1 increases, it increases less than q2 decreases.
Note however that production efficiency is maintained: Although U
wants to reduce q2 as much as possible, it still prefers to supply qC2
rather than letting Uˆ supply it. Denoting by πC1 and πC2 the correspond-
ing Cournot profits, the equilibrium profits are given by:
πU+D1 =πC1 + (cˆ− c)qC2
πD2 =πC2 .
who supplies who: the dominant supplier can then reduce downstream rents by of-
fering lower prices only “off the equilibrium”, if one firm were to go to the alternative
supplier.
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C : Cournot equilibrium (c1 = c2 = c)
A : Asymmetric Cournot equilibrium (c1 = c < c2 = cˆ)
Hence, D2 is hurt by vertical integration, while U −D1’s aggregate
profit is higher, since industry profit is higher.52 Vertical integration thus
benefits the integrated firms and hurts the nonintegrated one. Although
it maintains production efficiency, it lowers consumer surplus and total
welfare. Furthermore, the higher the cost of bypassing the bottleneck
producer, the larger the negative impacts on consumers and welfare.53
Last, it is interesting to note that vertical integration is more profitable,
the less competitive the bypass opportunity (the higher cˆ is).
The motivation for foreclosure is again here the preservation of an
52The aggregate quantity is now lower, and lies between Qm and QC = 2qC (and
qC1 + q
C
2 = Q
m for cˆ sufficiently large), and production efficiency is maintained.
53Note that Uˆ or D2 cannot gain by ”fighting back” and integrating themselves.
In equilibrium, D2 gets actually exactly as much as it would being integrated with
Uˆ . For more general situations, in which “bandwaggoning” may occur, see Hart and
Tirole (1990).
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existing market power in a segment. By contrast, in Ordover et al.
(1990), an upstream firm has no such market power and faces instead
an equally efficient supplier. Yet, it is shown that such a firm may
have an incentive to integrate vertically if (i) it can commit to limit
its supplies to the downstream rivals and hence to expose them to the
upstream competitor’s market power thus created, and (ii) the upstream
competitor can charge only linear prices so that its exercise of market
power on the nonintegrated downstream firm operates through a high
wholesale price rather than a high fixed fee. Several authors have built
on Ordover et al. and relaxed some of their assumptions. In particular,
Choi and Yi (2000) and Ma (1997) dispense in different settings with
the commitment assumption, although not with the linear pricing one.54
2.2.2 Policy implications
Since vertical integration can lead to foreclosure and have a negative
impact on consumers and total welfare, it is natural to ask which type
of policy, short of structural separation, might nullify or at least limit
this negative impact.
Upstream versus downstream bottleneck We noted that, in the
absence of vertical integration, it is socially desirable to ensure if feasible
that the most competitive segment of the market has access to final
consumers. This is still the case under vertical integration as we now
show.
Let us first consider the no bypass case, with a monopolist M in one
segment (good A) and a competitive duopoly (C1 and C2) in the other
segment (good B). Integration between M and, say, C1, then leads to
the perfect monopoly outcome even if the competitive segment is down-
stream (see the above analysis). In that case, whether the competitive
segment (good B) or the monopolistic one (good A) is downstream does
not matter (that is, given vertical integration betweenM and C1, which
segment is at the interface with consumers is irrelevant; however,M and
C1 only have an incentive to integrate if the bottleneck is upstream be-
cause a downstream bottleneck does not face the commitment problem).
54See also Salinger (1988) and Gaudet and Long (1996)
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In the richer framework with possible bypass of the bottleneck segment,
however, whether this bottleneck is upstream or downstream again mat-
ters. The idea is that, when the bottleneck is downstream, then the less
efficient alternative supplier cannot be shut down, which results in pro-
ductive inefficiency. To see this, assume that there is now an alternative,
but inferior supplier, Mˆ , for good A. If the segment for good A is up-
stream, then formally the situation is the same as the one described in
the previous subsection: The outcome is the asymmetric Cournot out-
come {q1 = RC(q2), q2 = RˆC(q1)}, but production is efficient (M supplies
both C1 and C2). If instead good A is downstream (that is, M and Mˆ
deal directly with final consumers), then, whether M is integrated with
D1 or not, bothM and Mˆ have access to good B at marginal cost (zero),
and M chooses to offer q1 = RC(q2), whereas Mˆ offers q2 = RˆC(q1). As
a result, the equilibrium quantities and prices are the same in both cases
and correspond to the asymmetric Cournot duopoly, but production is
organized inefficiently (qC2 is produced by the inefficient alternative sup-
plier Mˆ , entailing a social loss (cˆ − c)qC2 ). [Note that M , if located
downstream, is indifferent between integrating upstream with C1 and
remaining unintegrated.] Furthermore, whether the bottleneck is inte-
grated or not, it is again socially desirable to have the most competitive
segment (good B) downstream, i.e. at the interface with final consumers.
Table 2 summarizes the equilibrium allocation.
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No bypass (without Mˆ) Bypass (with Mˆ)
BU
BD
V I
M
M
NI
C
M
BU
BD
V I
AC
AC
NI
C
AC
IP IP
&¥
¦
¶ ³
&
Table 2
Vertical Integration (V I) or No Integration (NI)
Bottleneck Upstream (BU) or Downstream (BD)
M : pure Monopoly outcome
C : Cournot equilibrium (c1 = c2 = c)
AC : Asymmetric Cournot equilibrium (c1 = c , c2 = cˆ)
IP : Inefficient Production (loss (cˆ− c)qC2 )
ECPR55 We now show that ECPR may not preclude or impose any
constraint on foreclosure in our framework. That is, assuming that ver-
tical integration between the upstream bottleneck and a downstream
firm has taken place, the equilibrium outcome in the absence of ECPR
satisfies ECPR.
Let us assume as a first step that bypass of the bottleneck is infeasi-
ble. As seen above, in the absence of any constraint the integrated firm
U −D1 de facto excludes D2 and charges the monopoly price, pm, in the
final good market. We can check that the integrated bottleneck’s opti-
mal policy can be made consistent with ECPR by offering a linear access
price w2 to D2 that (a) satisfies ECPR and (b) excludes D2. Assuming
as above that downstream unit costs are zero, to meet ECPR the access
price must satisfy w2 ≤ pm − 0 = pm. But this cap on the access price
does not really help D2 to enter the market effectively. Indeed, suppose
that the integrated firm sets a linear access charge w2 = pm, and that it
produces q1 = Qm in equilibrium. Buying q2 units of intermediate good
55A much broader analysis of the impact of ECPR (in regulated and unregulated
markets) can be found in Armstrong (2002).
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at that price pm and transforming (at no cost) this intermediate good
into final good yields:
[P (Qm + q2)− w2]q2 < [P (Qm)− w2]q2 = 0.
D2 has thus no viable activity under ECPR.
Second, consider the case where there is an alternative, less efficient
supplier for the intermediate good (Uˆ , with unit cost cˆ > c). In that case,
the integrated firm U −D1 produces qC1 > qC whereas the nonintegrated
one, D2, buys the intermediate good at w2 = cˆ and produces qC2 < qC ;
note that the equilibrium price for the final good, pˆC ≡ P (qC1 + qC2 ), is
necessarily higher than D2’s marginal cost, cˆ. Since pˆC > cˆ and w2 = cˆ
in the range where the threat of bypass is a constraint for the upstream
monopolist, ECPR is again satisfied by the foreclosure outcome.
We conclude that, with or without the possibility of bypass, ECPR
has no bite. The problem of course is not that ECPR is “wrong” per se,
but rather that it is expected to perform a function it was not designed
for.56
2.3 Restoring monopoly power: exclusive dealing
The previous section reviewed the dominant firm’ s incentives to ver-
tically integrate in order to extend its market power. When used for
that purpose, vertical integration gives rise to foreclosure and thus gen-
erates a social cost (vertical integration may also yield social benefits,
which we discuss in the next section). To evaluate the social costs and
benefits of preventing vertical integration, however, it may be necessary
to investigate the alternative strategies available to dominant firms for
implementing foreclosure and the relative costs of these strategies. One
such strategy is “exclusive dealing” or “exclusive supply” agreements.57
56See, e.g. Baumol et al. (1995) and Laffont and Tirole (1999) for a discussion of
the facts that ECPR is only a partial rule, and that ECPR, even when it is optimal
in the presence of other well-calibrated instruments, cannot achieve the optimum in
the absence of these other instruments.
57Depending on the context, exclusive dealing agreements can take various forms:
exclusive territories for retailers, exclusive license, and so form. These exclusive deal-
ing agreements involve a commitment not to deal with other downstream firms, which
may be easier to monitor and to enforce, and thus more credible than a commitment
to deal with them “up to some level” (e.g., half of the monopoly quantity).
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2.3.1 Basic framework: exclusive dealing as a substitute for
vertical integration
Consider, first, the basic framework, in which an upstream monopolist,
U , sells to two downstream firms, D1 and D2. Vertical integration with,
say, D1, then allows U to monopolize the entire industry in the Cournot
case. Consequently, D2 is excluded from the market. Assuming now
that vertical integration is prohibited, the upstream monopolist U can
nevertheless achieve the same outcome by signing an exclusive agreement
with D1: By entering into such an agreement, U de facto commits itself
not to sell to D2 and thus eliminates the risk of opportunism. In this
simple framework, an exclusive dealing arrangement is thus a perfect
substitute for — and arguably a more straightforward solution to the
commitment problem than — vertical integration. In particular, a policy
that would prevent vertical mergers would have no effect if exclusive
dealing were allowed.
Because it introduces a rigid constraint, exclusive dealing may ac-
tually be privately and socially less desirable than vertical integration.
This is for example the case if there is some room for other upstream or
downstream firms under vertical integration, as we now demonstrate.58
2.3.2 Exclusive dealing generates production inefficiency in
the presence of bypass
Consider next the case where there is an alternative, less efficient sup-
plier, Uˆ , with higher cost than U : cˆ > c. Although vertical integration
with D1 does not allow U to maintain the monopoly outcome, it never-
theless entails some foreclosure of D2 and leads to a reduction of total
output. However, in this context, the most efficient supplier, U , still sup-
plies both downstream firms D1 and D2 : U indeed does not want D2 to
buy from its rival (and in equilibrium, U supplies D2 exactly the amount
that D2 would have bought from Uˆ). In contrast, an exclusive agreement
with D1 would lead to the same reduction in output, but would more-
58Conversely, there may be circumstances where vertical integration might be an
inferior substitute to exclusive dealing (e.g., because of internal organizational costs);
a policy that would be more restrictive against exclusive deals than against vertical
integration might then lead again to an alternative, less desirable solution.
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over introduce an additional efficiency loss, since in that case D2 would
have to buy from Uˆ (compared with vertical integration, the additional
welfare loss is equal to the loss in profit, namely (cˆ− c)qC2 ).59
Exclusive dealing is clearly profitable when the alternative supplier
is quite inefficient, since in the limit case where Uˆ does not impose any
competitive constraint, U gets the full monopoly profit with exclusive
dealing and only the Cournot profit otherwise. When Uˆ is quite efficient
(that is, cˆ close to c), however, U may prefer serving both downstream
firms. To see this, suppose that, before negotiating with D1 and D2, U
can choose to auction off an exclusive dealing contract. If U does not
offer exclusivity, the Cournot outcome
¡
qC , qC
¢
is achieved but each Di
gets a rent, equal to rN = maxq
©¡
P
¡
qC + q
¢
− cˆ
¢
q
ª
; U thus obtains
πNU (cˆ) = 2
¡
πC − rN
¢
, which is positive as long as cˆ > c. If instead U
auctions the right to be supplied exclusively, the asymmetric Cournot
outcome
¡
qC1 (cˆ) , qC2 (cˆ)
¢
is achieved (where qC1 and qC2 , which coincide
with qC when cˆ = c, are respectively increasing and decreasing in cˆ) and
each downstream firm bids up to what it would earn if it were to lose
the auction, which is equal to rE = maxq
©¡
P
¡
qC1 (cˆ) + q
¢
− cˆ
¢
q
ª
. Thus,
by auctioning an exclusive deal, U can earn πEU (cˆ) = π
C
1 − rE. Both
options (offering exclusivity or not) yield zero profit when the second
supplier is equally efficient (πNU = πEU = 0 when cˆ = c) and become more
profitable as Uˆ becomes less efficient; as already noted, the second option
clearly dominates when Uˆ is sufficiently inefficient (π1U is capped by the
Cournot profit, while π2U increases up to the full monopoly profit), but
the first option might dominate when Uˆ is quite efficient (cˆ close to c)
and Cournot quantities do not react too much to cost asymmetry.60
59Chen and Riordan (2004) point out that a vertically integrated firm might still be
able to monopolize the industry by entering into an exclusive deal with D2, thereby
committing itself not to compete in the downstream market; thus, vertical integra-
tion and exclusivity may together succeed in monopolizing the industry, even when
vertical integration or exclusivity alone would not achieve that result.
60If a small asymmetry had no impact on quantities (i.e., q1 = q2 = qˆ in the various
configurations for cˆ close to c), then clearly πNU (cˆ) = 2 (cˆ− c) qˆ > πEU (cˆ) = (cˆ− c) qˆ.
When both demand and costs are linear, however, quantities respond “enough” to
cost asymmetry to make exclusive dealing always profitable; one can check that, for
P (q) = 1− q and c = 0, U ’s profits are respectively πNU (cˆ) = 29
³
1−
¡
1− 32 cˆ
¢2´
and
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2.3.3 Exclusive dealing and downstream product differentia-
tion
Consider now the case where there is no alternative supplier, but there
are two downstream firms producing differentiated products, which are
sufficiently valuable that an integrated monopoly would choose to pro-
duce both. As in section 2.3.2, vertical integration of the bottleneck
with D1 may again not lead to the full monopolization of the industry,
but in general maintains D2 alive. That is, the integrated firm U −D1
may want to supply D2, although in a discriminatory way, rather than
forcingD2 completely out of the market. In contrast, an exclusive agree-
ment withD1 would lead de facto to the exclusion of D2, and might thus
result in yet another inefficiency and reduction in welfare.61
2.3.4 Discussion
In the two situations just analyzed, exclusive dealing yields less profit
to U than vertical integration, and ruling out vertical mergers but not
exclusive dealing arrangements thus forces U to choose a socially less
desirable outcome. In the first case, an exclusive dealing arrangement
between the efficient upstream supplier and one of the downstream firms
forces the other downstream firm(s) to switch to an alternative, less
efficient supplier. In the second case, the exclusive dealing arrangement
de facto excludes rival downstream firms and thus reduces the choice
offered to final consumers, in contrast to what happens under vertical
integration.
This raises an important issue for policy design: There is no point
forbidding one practice (here, vertical integration) if it leads the firms to
adopt practices (here, exclusive agreements) that are even less desirable
from all (firms’ and consumers’) perspectives.
πEU (cˆ) =
1
9
³
(1 + cˆ)2 − (1− 2cˆ)2
´
, and thus
dπEU (cˆ) /dcˆ =
2
3
(1− cˆ) > dπNU (cˆ) /dcˆ =
2
3
− cˆ.
61There again, exclusive dealing is profitable as long as downstream differentiation
remains limited, but may otherwise become unprofitable (in particular, U prefers
serving both D1 and D2 when they do not really compete against each other).
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2.4 Further issues
Needless to say, our treatment is far from exhaustive. Let us mention a
number of important topics or further developments.
— Private incentives not to exclude. We have emphasized the bot-
tleneck’s incentive to exclude in order to restore market power. To be
certain, exclusion need not be complete, as when the bottleneck pro-
ducer faces competition from a less efficient rival; but still then, the
bottleneck owner does everything it can to restrict downstream output
and just prefers to substitute its own production for that of the upstream
rival. There are at least two situations, though, in which the bottleneck
producer is less eager to exclude (we only sketch the reasoning. Details
and further discussion is provided in Appendix A).
First, independent users of the intermediate good may sink invest-
ments that orient their technology toward that of the upstream bottle-
neck or toward an alternative technology, for which there are compet-
itive suppliers. They will choose the latter if they anticipate that the
upstream bottleneck will practice foreclosure, for example if it has inte-
grated downstream. The problem is one of commitment: to prevent inef-
ficient choices of bypass technologies, the bottleneck owner would like to
commit not to foreclose, which may require divesting downstream units,
committing not to choose an exclusive customer, and so forth. The
Appendix discusses in this light the voluntary divestiture of AT&T’s
equipment division (Lucent Technologies).
Second, and reversing the protection-of-specific-investments argu-
ment, an upstream bottleneck owner who has to sink specific investment
does not want to face the prospect of hold-up in a bilateral monopoly sit-
uation with a favored downstream user (Chemla 2003). It is well-known
that competition protects investments in environments in which efficient
long-term contracts are difficult to write. Certain forms of foreclosure
may have the undesirable side-effect of leading to the expropriation of
the upstream monopolist’s investment through ex post bargaining.
— The “Coasian logic” applies beyond industrial markets. For ex-
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ample, in Cestone and White (2003), a financial intermediary (bank,
venture capitalist, etc.) must develop some expertise in order to assess
whether a line of business is promising, how to tailor the contract to the
technology, or how to monitor the borrower. But once the intermediary
has sunk the corresponding investment, nothing prevents it from funding
another venture in the same line of business. That is, the financial in-
termediary becomes an upstream bottleneck who may be (sequentially)
tempted to finance many competing ventures and may therefore not be
able to extract rents (and possibly recoup the initial investment). The
response to Coase’s problem emphasized in Cestone-White is the owner-
ship of equity stakes by the intermediary, which, at the cost of diluting
the borrower’s incentives, at least force the intermediary to internalize
some of the loss of profit associated with the funding of competing ven-
tures, while a debt contract would be more efficient in the absence of a
commitment problem.
— General results on contracting with externalities. In an important,
more abstract paper on contracting with externalities, Segal (1999) looks
at more general situations in which a principal contracts with multi-
ple agents and the contract with a particular agent exerts externalities
on other agents (product-market-competition externalities in our frame-
work). He obtain general results on the extent of trade between the
principal and the agents when contracts are secret, as a function of the
nature of the externalities, and then studies the case in which the prin-
cipal is able to make public commitments.
— Alternative conjectures. As we have seen, the passive-conjecture
assumption is a reasonable one in the Cournot situation in which the
upstream monopolist produces to order. It is much less appealing in the
case of Bertrand competition, and indeed in many games of contract-
ing with externalities, where the contract signed with one downstream
competitor affects the contracting terms that the upstream monopolist
would like to offer to the competitor’s rivals.
This strategic interdependence among the contracts signed with the
different competitors has two implications. First, at the technical level,
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it creates nonconcavities and, as a result, pure-strategy equilibria with
passive beliefs may not exist anymore. This is because the gain from
a multilateral deviation, i.e. a simultaneous change in the contracts of-
fered to D1 and D2, may then exceed the total gains of the unilateral
deviations, i.e. stand-alone modifications of the contract offered to one
of the downstream firms. Rey and Vergé (2004) show that the unique
“contract equilibrium”, characterized by O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) us-
ing bilateral deviations, does not survive multilateral deviations when
the cross elasticity is at least half of the direct demand elasticity. 62
Second, a downstream firm should anticipate that, if the supplier offers
it an out-of-equilibrium contract, the latter has an incentive to change
the contracts offered to the others. Passive beliefs thus appear less plau-
sible. McAfee and Schwartz (1994) propose to consider instead wary
beliefs where, when it receives an unexpected offer, a downstream firm
anticipates that the supplier acts optimally with its rivals, given the
offer just received. Rey and Vergé (2004) show that, when demand is
linear, wary beliefs equilibria exist even when passive beliefs equilibria
fail to exist, and these equilibria exhibit some degree of opportunism:
the upstream firm does not fully exploit its market power, although it
performs better than when downstream firms hold passive beliefs; in ad-
dition, prices are lower with Cournot than with Bertrand downstream
competition.63
Segal and Whinston (2003) take another route and investigate in
more general settings the set of conclusions that are robust to the choice
of conjectures. They fully characterize equilibrium profits in offer games.
— Bidding games. We have mostly supposed so far that the upstream
firm has the initiative and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each down-
62Segal and Whinston (2003) note a similar existence problem when the manufac-
turer faces non-constant returns to scale. McAfee and Schwartz (1995) also point
out that, when contracts are observed before the actual stage of downstream com-
petition, the unique candidate equilibrium for passive beliefs may generate negative
profits.
63Rey and Vergé also confirm the insight of O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), who
pointed out that RPM can help an upstream manufacturer to exploit its market
power. The idea is that RPM allows the upstream monopolist to squeeze its retail-
ers’ margins, thereby eliminating any scope for opportunism.
46
stream firm. Another stream of the literature studies situations where
instead downstream rivals bid for the input supplied by an upstreammo-
nopolist. In the bidding games considered by Segal and Whinston (2003)
and Martimort and Stole (2003), where the downstream rivals make the
offers but the upstream monopolist eventually chooses how much to sup-
ply, the equilibrium outcome is again competitive; in essence, each bid-
der then exerts an externality on the other, which the contracts cannot
internalize despite using a common supplier.
In contrast, when the downstream firms eventually determine quan-
tities and the offers are public, they can protect themselves again oppor-
tunistic behavior by the rivals, by offering a flexible contract that allows
them to adapt their actual purchases to the terms offered by the rivals’
contracts. Marx and Shaffer (2004) stress however that, even when con-
tracts are public, coordination among the downstream firms may still
fail and exclusive dealing may arise instead. The intuition is as follows:
in any equilibrium where both downstream firms are active, the sup-
plier must be indifferent between supplying both or only one firm, but
each firm benefits from being an exclusive agent. This can be achieved
through an exclusive dealing contract or, as noted by Marx and Shaf-
fer, by making the fixed fee partly conditional on the downstream firm’s
eventually purchasing a positive quantity; in effect, a high enough condi-
tional fixed fee deters the upstream monopolist from supplying its input
to the rival, as the downstream firm would not purchase — and thus not
pay the fee — in that case.64 Rey et al. (2005) however show that al-
lowing for contingent offers, where the terms of the contract depend on
exclusivity, leads to the industry integrated outcome, with both retailers
active and each receiving its contribution to total profits.
Another strand of literature looks at how downstream rivals may
want to lock in the supplies of a competitively supplied input in order
to monopolize the downstream market. In Stahl (1988) and Yanelle
64The conditional fixed fee can for example be set equal to the profit that the
downstream firm can expect to achieve under exclusivity; the non-conditional part of
the fee can then take the form of an upfront payment from the supplier to the down-
stream firm (as in the case of listing fees paid by manufacturers to large retailers).
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(1997), competing downstream firms bid up to corner supplies so as to
become a downstream monopoly. In equilibrium, a single firm acquires
all supplies and charges the monopoly price in the downstream price in
the downstream market. This firm however makes no profit because it
spends this monopoly profit to bid up supplies.
In Riordan (1998), the upstream market is served by a competitive
industry, with an upward sloping supply curve. The downstream mar-
ket is populated by a dominant firm and a competitive fringe. The
dominant firm enjoys a first mover advantage in contracting for its in-
put requirements. The upstream industry then supplies the downstream
competitive fringe. An increase in the dominant firm’s purchase of the
input raises the fringe’s marginal cost of production through a higher
wholesale price (since the upstream supply curve is upward sloping) — a
foreclosure effect — ; at the same time, the downstream dominant firm
is not eager to produce much downstream and therefore to buy much
upstream.
In this context, Riordan analyzes the impact of a prior and exogenous
ownership stake in the upstream industry (“vertical integration”); that
is, the dominant firm starts with input supplies k0 ≥ 0 and may want
to increase its supplies beyond k0. Riordan shows that an increase in
k0 raises both the wholesale and the final prices. Intuitively, the initial
ownership stake makes it cheaper for the dominant firm to raise the
fringe’s marginal cost though an increase in the wholesale prices (the
dominant firm is protected by ownership against the price increase for
the first k0 units). This increased foreclosure raises the downstream price
as well. It would be interesting to investigate65 whether the dominant
firm has an incentive to buy the ownership stake k0, though. In fact, the
expectation of higher wholesale price raises the cost of acquiring a unit
ownership stake, as k0 grows. So the dominant firm ends up paying for
the wholesale price increase, which may well dissuade it from acquiring
the stake in the first place.
65Along the lines of Burkart et al. (1998), Joskow and Tirole (2000) and Gilbert
et al. (2004).
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3 Horizontal foreclosure
We now turn to horizontal foreclosure, referring to situations in which:
(i) a firm M is present in two final markets, A and B; and (ii) this
firm M has substantial market power in market A, called for simplicity
the “monopoly segment” and faces actual or potential competition in
market B, labelled the “competitive segment”. In such a situation, the
traditional “leverage” concern is that M could foreclosure competitors
in market B by tying the bottleneck good A to its own offering in B.
This leverage theory has been used in many high-profile cases involving
complements — particularly when product B has low value, or is even
useless, unless combined with product A (memory or software and CPUs
for mainframe computers, parts or maintenance services and original
equipment, and so forth).
However, as the Chicago School pointed out, tying need not be a
rational anticompetitive strategy for M . The key point is that, even
though good A is sold separately, so there are indeed two markets and
two profits to be made,M can extract its profit through its pricing in the
monopoly market A rather than through seeking to exercise monopoly
power in the adjacent market B. Furthermore, when the second prod-
uct is a complement to the first, a monopolist that can exploit its mar-
ket power for its own monopolized product has no interest in excluding
low-cost and high-quality varieties from the market since their presence
makes its own product more attractive to consumers: reducing compe-
tition in market B makes good A less desirable to the consumers.
To illustrate this, suppose that good B is useless unless combined
with good A.66 To simplify, suppose that consumers want one unit of
each good. With a slight abuse of notation, consumers derive surplus
A from good A alone, and an additional surplus B from M ’s version
of good B, while several independent producers can produce a better
version of good B, yielding a higher surplus Bˆ ≥ B (provided, of course,
that they also consume good A). M has constant unit costs a and b,
66A situation that would look very similar to that considered for vertical foreclo-
sure. The crucial difference, though, is that good B (the counterpart of the “down-
stream” good) and good A are here sold separately.
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respectively, in the two markets, while B-rivals produce at a lower cost
bˆ ≤ b.
— Bundling. By tying the bottleneck good A to its own version of
B, M can foreclose rivals in market B and thus become a monopolist in
both markets; it can then either sell the bottleneck good at price A and
the other good at price B or the combination of the two goods at price
PM = A+B; both options result in a per-customer profit of
πM = A− a+B − b.
— Unbundling. By contrast, in the absence of foreclosure, competi-
tion among the independent B producers leads them to offer the better
version of B at their low marginal cost; consumers thus derive on market
B a surplus equal to Bˆ− bˆ; but then,M can increase the price it charges
for good A from A to up to A+ Bˆ − bˆ and realize a per-customer profit
of
πM +∆,
where
∆ ≡
³
Bˆ −B
´
+
³
b− bˆ
´
denotes the technological advantage of the rivals. In other words,M loses
from foreclosing access and becoming a B-monopolist. The point is that
any additional surplus provided by B-competitors increases consumers’
valuation of the bottleneck good, which M can then extract (at least
partially) by exerting its market power on that segment.
Here again, the Chicago School view has led industrial economists
to reconsider the leverage argument. Three lines of argument have been
developed.67
First, when the products are relatively independent, the above ob-
servation does not apply: a second source of monopoly power does not
devalueM ’s original monopolized product. If in addition the monopolist
has a realistic chance of driving competitors out of — or of discouraging
entry in — the adjacent market, then committing to sell the two goods
67See Whinston (2001) for an informal survey of this literature.
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as a bundle, and only as a bundle, can serve as a strategic commitment
to be a tough competitor in market B — since then, any lost sale in B
implies a lost sale as well in the core market A — and can thus deter
potential competitors in market B.
Second, even when the two goods are complements, entry in the
adjacent market B may facilitate entry in the monopolized market A.
Then, the incumbent monopolist M may be tempted to deter entry in
the adjacent market in order to help prevent entry in its core market.
Last, the mere fact that the integrated firmM is present in two com-
plementary markets A and B affects that firm’s incentives to invest in B,
since any increase in competition in B enhances consumers’ willingness
to pay for the monopolized product in A. This, in turn, alters rivals’
incentives to invest and innovate in the adjacent market.
These arguments are discussed in turn in the next three sections.
3.1 Entry deterrence in the tied market
The first response to the Chicago critique in the case of adjacent markets
is Whinston (1990)’s classic paper. His idea is best illustrated in the
case in which goods A and B are independent. Suppose that M , the
monopolist in marketA, faces potential competition in marketB from an
entrant E, who has not yet incurred a fixed cost of entry. Whinston’s key
insight is that tying the two goods makes M de facto more aggressive in
market B, and thus may discourage the rival from entering that market.
A tie-in may thereby increase M ’s overall profit.
For example, consider the same example as above, except that:
• the demands for the two goods A and B are independent; that is,
consumers as before have unit demands for each good, but now
derive utility from good B whether or not they buy good A.
• in the B market, one potential entrant, E, must incur a sunk cost
of entry in order to be active in the market.
• before the entry decision, M decides whether to sell the two goods
as a bundle — and only as a bundle. Bundling then cannot be
undone and therefore has commitment value.
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So the timing goes as follows: (i) M chooses whether to bundle; (ii)
E decides whether to enter, in which case it incurs a fixed cost f (in per-
customer terms); (iii) M and E choose their prices (that is, depending
on the bundling decision, M sets either a price P for the bundle or two
distinct prices for A and B, while E sets a price for its B version if it
entered the market).
— Unbundling. If goods A and B are sold separately, M sells the
former at price A, so as to extract all consumer surplus, and thus makes
a per-customer profit or marginmA = A−a on the A segment; in market
B, E enters and drives M out of the market, yielding a profit ∆ for E
and a surplus B − b for the consumers.
— Bundling. Suppose instead that M decides to sell the two goods
as a bundle. For consumers, buying this bundle amounts to buying M ’s
version of good B at an effective price of P −A. ForM , the opportunity
cost of a sale of good B is no longer b, but
b0 = b−mA;
that is,M ’s fictitious margin on good B should not be computed simply
using B’s marginal cost of production, b, but should also reflect the fact
thatM loses a sale on A (with value mA) every time it loses a sale of B.
This generates a more aggressive behavior byM in case of entry, sinceM
would be willing to charge an effective price as low as b0; in other words,
in order to maintain its salesM would be willing to charge for the bundle
a price P as low as its marginal cost of production: P = a + b. This,
of course, reduces E’s profit, since E is now facing a more aggressive
behavior from M in market B.
Tying can then successfully deter entry if E’s competitive advantage,
∆, is small compared to the surplus generated by the bottleneck good,
mA = A− a; more precisely:
- if ∆ < mA, M wins the competition since consumers prefer buying
the bundle at marginal cost a+b rather than buying the entrant’s product
at at marginal cost bˆ:
(A+B)− (a+ b) > Bˆ − bˆ = B − b+∆⇔ ∆ < mA;
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in that case, E cannot win the B market sinceM is willing to charge an
“effective” price below the entrant’s quality-adjusted cost.
- if ∆ > mA > ∆ − f , if it enters E wins the competition but at a
price which is too low to cover the cost of entry; E’s margin mE must
be such that
Bˆ − bˆ−mE = B − b+∆−mE ≥ (A+B)− (a+ b) ,
or
mE ≤ ∆−mA,
and thus does not allow E to recoup the per-customer entry cost f .
In both cases, bundling allows M to discourage E from entering the
market. In the end, M charges P = A + B for the bundle, and enjoys
de facto per-customer profit B − b in market B.68
This simple example identifies several conditions for a tie-in to be
profitable:69
a) M must commit itself to a tie-in. Otherwise, once entry occurs,M
no longer has an incentive to bundle A and B. Suppose indeed that the
potential competitor has already sunk the entry cost and is thus present
in market B. In the absence of bundlingM loses market B but makes a
per-customer profit mA in market A. In contrast, bundling reduces M ’s
profit by ∆ even if M wins the competition with the entrant: in order
to maintain its position, M charges a maximal price of
P = A+ b−∆
and makes a per-customer profit of only mA −∆.
Therefore, the use of tying as an entry barrier relies on a strong
commitment. Such commitment is more likely to obtain through tech-
nological choices (for example, making A irreversibly incompatible with
68With variable demands (e.g., heterogenous preferences) for the two goods,
bundling per se can reduce M ’s profitability; even in that case, however, bundling
may be a profitable strategy when it deters entry — see the discussion in Whinston
(1990).
69Nalebuff (2003a) provides a full discussion of tying issues in the light of recent
cases.
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competitive B versions, or by designing the two goods as a single inte-
grated system) than through purely commercial bundling, where prices
or conditional rebates can be subject to renegotiation, particularly in
response to entry.
b) The strategy must deter entry (or induce exit) of competitors in
market B. As just observed, a tie-in is self-defeating if competitors stay
in the market, because it increases the intensity of price competition:
firms are more eager to make such price concessions, since a concession
for one component then generates sales for all the components of the
bundle.
c) Goods A and B must be rather independent. As pointed out by
Whinston, when goods A and B are complementary the Chicago critique
applies: the exit of competitors from market B mutilates good A (which
it did not do under independent demands) and thus anticompetitive
tie-ins are less likely for very complementary segments; if for example
good B were useless unless combined with good A, then M would have
no incentive to deter entry, since the entrant’s competitive edge on B
would reinforce consumer demand for the monopolized good A.
Suppose for instance that M is a price leader and modify the above-
described stage (iii) as follows: M first choose its price(s) — for the
bundle or for its components — and then E, if it entered, sets its price
for B. Then, absent bundling and following E’s entry, M would charge
a low price (slightly above) bˆ −
³
Bˆ −B
´
= b −∆ (thus below its own
cost) for its B component, forcing E to sell at cost, and would recover
(almost) all of E’s added value through a high price (A+B +∆) on
the bottleneck component A. Of course, in practice M may not be able
to extract all of E’s added value: in the absence of price leadership,
competition may allow E to keep part or even all of its technological
advantage (∆).70 Still, M would have no incentive to bundle and deter
70When M and E set their prices simultaneously, there are many equilibria, gen-
erating any sharing of the gain ∆ — see e.g. Ordover et al. (1985). In particular,
the prices that emerge when M acts as a price leader still constitute an equilibrium
outcome when M and E set their prices simultaneously; the equilibrium that would
obtain under the price leadership of E is also an equilibrium, in which E keeps all
of its technological advantage ∆. Eliminating weakly dominated strategies however
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entry, and as long as it extracts some of E’s efficiency gain, it would
actually have an incentive to unbundle and to encourage entry in the
B-market.71
Remark: bundling and competition. The fact that bundling inten-
sifies competition has been further emphasized by Matutes and Reg-
ibeau (1988) and Economides (1989), who focus on the compatibility
choices of competing firms that each offer all components of a system.72
When firms opt for compatibility, “market-by-market” competition pre-
vails, where firms compete separately for each component; in contrast,
under incompatibility, consumers cannot “mix-and-match” rival firms’
components: competition in bundles thus prevails and competition is
again more intense.73 The argument applies as well to the case of mixed
bundling, where firms set different prices for stand-alone components
and bundles (in practice, this can take the form of conditional discounts,
where consumers receive a discount on one component if they buy an-
other component from the same firm).74 Nalebuff (2000) extends the
excludes any below cost pricing strategy for M and would thus single out the equi-
librium where the entrant obtains all the benefits of its competitive advantage ∆.
71See Whinston (1990) for a fuller discussion of situations where tying can be a
profitable enty deterrence device.
72Bundling, like (in-)compatibility choices, are examples of endogenous switching
costs. Therefore, many insights from the analysis of switching costs (see Farrell and
Klemperer (2006) for a detailed survey) apply here as well.
73These papers thus focus on the case of perfect complements, whereas Whin-
ston (1990) studies mainly the case of independent goods. The distinction between
independent goods and complements tends however to be blurred when total de-
mand is fixed (the “whole market” is served, say). In the absence of bundling, or
with compatible technologies in the case of complements, the same market-by-market
competition then obtains whether the goods are complements or independent, while
bundling or incompatible technologies lead in both cases to the same system compe-
tition (a possible caveat concerns the possibility of buying two bundles in order to
“mix and match”, which may be relevant when unit costs are low and in the absence
of technical integration). The distinction between independent and complementary
goods plays a more important role when total demand is elastic; with complements,
there is then an interaction across markets even in the absence of bundling.
74Choi submitted to the European Commission, in the context of the
GE/Honeywell merger, a model in which a firm produces two complementary goods
(e.g., aircraft engines and avionics) and competes with unintegrated firms in each
market. Assuming linear demand and cost, Choi showed that rivals face tougher
competition and can lose market share, in spite of lower prices, when the integrated
firm is allowed to set a price for the bundle, in addition to component prices — see
Choi (2001) and Nalebuff (2003b) for a fuller discussion of this case.
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analysis to the case of an integrated firm competing against noninte-
grated rivals for a system with many components (that is, one firm offers
a version of all components, and competes with a different firm for each
component). Nalebuff points out that, while bundling intensifies price
competition, it also gives a larger market share to the integrated firm
than the latter would have without bundling; this is because the unin-
tegrated firms face double — or multiple — marginalization problems.75
Nalebuff further shows that, as the number of components becomes large
(and double marginalization problems thus pile up), the gain in market
share may become so important as to offset the price reduction that
stems from the more intense competition. In that case, bundling may
actually benefit the integrated firm.
In many markets, the complementary goods are or may be purchased
sequentially (examples include razors and blades, mobile telephones and
accessories such as car chargers, new cars and spare parts, and comput-
ers and component upgrades). In such markets, it is sometimes feared
that manufacturers may tie the additional equipment to the original one,
or else make their original equipment incompatible with the additional
equipment of rival manufacturers, in order to “lock in” consumers and
weaken price competition in the subsequent market. In that case, how-
ever, anticipating this risk of opportunism consumers are willing to pay
less for their initial purchases.76 That is, such as strategy would back-
fire, since the weakened ex post competition in the additional equipment
market triggers stronger competition for the original sales.77 ,78
75The integrated firm recognizes that cutting the price of one component boosts
the demand for complementary components. In the absence of bundling, however,
this benefits all components — its own and the rivals’ ones; in contrast, with bundling
the integrated firm knows that any sacrifice in the price of one component benefits
its own complementary components — and only its own — while unitegrated firms still
fail to take into account such positive feedback.
76Even if consumers rationally anticipate this opportunism, the incentive still exists
ex post as long as the supplier is unable to commit to future prices.
77See Klemperer (1995) for a comprehensive survey of oligopolistic competition
with switching costs.
78Manufacturers will thus have an incentive to limit their ability to hold up the
consumers. This can be done by developing a reputation; however, reputation build-
ing may prove difficult when the prices of the subsequent purchases are not readily
observable or when there is uncertainty about the exact need for additional equip-
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3.2 Protecting the monopolized market
While a monopolistic supplier would suffer from the exit of efficient pro-
ducers of complementary goods, this exit may make it easier to protect
the position of the bottleneck supplier in its core market. This is for ex-
ample the case when entry in one segment facilitates or encourages entry
in the other segment. Two variants of this idea have been explored. Choi
and Stefanadis (2001) emphasize that, when entry is risky (e.g., when
it involves R&D projects that may or may not succeed), tying the two
goods A and B reduces the expected return of entry in each market,
since entry in one market is then profitable only when entry is successful
in the other market as well; tying may in that case deter entry in both
markets. Carlton and Waldman (2002) focus instead on the presence
of economies of scope between entry decisions in the two markets. We
explore these two ideas in turn.
We use a framework similar to the one above, except thatM initially
benefits from a monopoly position in both markets A and B, and that
the two goods are valuable only when used together (perfect complemen-
tarity). In addition, we suppose now that an entrant E can potentially
enter both markets.79
— Risky entry. Following Choi and Stefanadis (2001), suppose that
in each market E can invest in R&D in order to enter that market. More
precisely, by investing f in R&D in any of the two markets, E succeeds
with probability ρ in developing a better variety of the good in question,
which it can then produce at a lower cost; as before, we will denote by ∆
the total gain in quality and cost. For simplicity, we assume symmetry
between the two goods, and in particular ∆ is the same for both. The
ment or services. Another possibility is to reduce endogenous switching costs and opt
for “open standards” (Garcia Mariñoso (2001)), grant licences, and so forth, so as to
commit to strong competition in the additional equipment and services, as stressed
in the second-sourcing literature — see Farrell and Gallini (1988) and Shepard (1987),
and Kende (1998) for a recent application.
79The analysis would apply as well to the case of independent entrants in the
two markets. Potential coordination problems might then reinforce M ’s incentive to
bundle and deter entry; see Choi and Stefanadis (2001) for an example of such a
coordination problem with variable levels of investment.
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R&D projects in the two markets are stochastically independent and
the timing is as follows:
• M decides whether to bundle the two goods; tying is then irre-
versible and, in addition, customers cannot undo the tie, nor do
they want to add a second version of a good they already have
(either the technologies are incompatible or the marginal cost, and
therefore the price of a component is high).80
• in each market, E decides whether to invest in R&D;
• M and E (in case of successful entry) set their price(s).
If E succeeds in entering both markets, it replaces M and gets 2∆.
If instead E succeeds in one market only, its profits depend on whether
M tied the two goods. If M bundled the two goods, E gains nothing if
it enters only one market, since one good is useless without the other.
Since there is no point investing in only one market, E does not invest
at all whenever
2f > 2ρ2∆.
In the absence of bundling, and when E enters in one market only,
competition takes place between M and E. As already noted, many
equilibria then exist, in which M and E share the efficiency gain ∆ in
different ways.
If E fully appropriates ∆ whenever a R&D project is successful,
whatever the outcome of the other R&D project. E therefore chooses
to invest — and then invests in both markets — if and only if
f < ρ∆.
80This latter possibility is less relevant in the case of information goods since the
marginal cost is very small (indeed, many Windows equipped computers now have
at least three media players besides Microsoft’s own version).
In the absence of a technological constraint, customers would be willing to pay
up to ∆ to use the entrant’s component on top of the bundle and the impact of
tying then largely depends on the production cost of the component. If the entrant
produces one component at a marginal cost aˆ, it cannot sell that single component
at a profitable price if aˆ > ∆, but can still get ∆− aˆ otherwise. Thus, when marginal
costs are very small, in the absence of some form of technical integration tying would
not prevent the entrant from retrieving most of its added value.
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Therefore, tying deters R&D and thus entry in both markets whenever
ρ2 <
f
∆
< ρ.
Tying is then a profitable strategy for M since with probability ρ2 it
prevents E from replacing M in both markets, and M gains nothing
when E enters a single market.81
As the analysis makes clear, the riskiness of entry projects plays a
key role here. If both R&D projects were certain, entry would occur
whenever f < ∆, with or without bundling.82
— Economies of scale and scope. Suppose now, following Carlton and
Waldman (2002), that entry takes more time in one market than in the
other. By reducing the profitability of being in one market only, tying
may then again deter E from entering either or even both markets.83
More precisely, suppose that:
• there are two periods, 1 and 2, and two perfect complements A
and B; in each period, consumers have unit demands as before; to
simplify notation we suppose that the interest rate is zero (firms
maximize the sum of the profits obtained in the two periods);
81If M can appropriate a share λ of E’s technological gain when E enters in only
one market (e.g., if M has a chance to act as a price leader), tying deters investment
and entry occurs “less often”, namely if and only if (R&D investments are strategic
complements, so that E undertakes either both projects or none):
ρ [1− λ (1− ρ)] < f
∆
< ρ;
furthermore, if it does deter investment, tying is profitable only when avoiding evic-
tion by the entrant (with would otherwise happen with probability ρ2) matters more
to the monopolist than getting a share λ of the technological gain when only one
project succeeds (which would happen with probability 2ρ (1− ρ)).
82It suffices that entry be risky in at least one market; tying may then deter
investment and entry in the other market — which in turn may deter entry in the
first one. For example, suppose that investing f brings the technological gain ∆
with certainty in nmarket A, whereas investing fˆ = ρf brings the innovation with
probability ρ in market B. Then, in the absence of tying, entry would occur in both
markets whenever ∆ > f , whereas with tying, entry (in both markets) only occurs
when ρ (2∆) > (1 + ρ) f , that is, when ∆ > (1 + ρ) f/ (2ρ) (> f).
83The analysis would formally be the same if, instead of two periods, there were two
independent demands for good B: a stand-alone demand for B and a demand for the
system {A,B}. In that case again, tying would reduce E’s profitability, by restricting
its customer base to those consumers that are interested in B on a stand-alone basis.
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• at the beginning of period 1,M decides whether to bundle the two
goods; as before, tying is then irreversible and cannot be undone
by customers;
• it is initially easier to enter the “adjacent market” (B) than the
“core market” (A): E can enter market B in either period, while it
can enter market A only in period 2; to market i = A,B, E must
incur a fixed cost fi (once for all);
• for simplicity, entry is not risky;84
• in the absence of tying, when E enters in one market only, it fully
appropriates its efficiency gain in that market;
• absent tying, entry in market A is profitable (we relax this assump-
tion below), whereas entry in market B is profitable only when it
generates profits in both periods: letting fi and ∆i denote, respec-
tively, the cost of entry and E’s technological edge in market i, we
have:
fA < ∆A, ∆B < fB < 2∆B;
in addition, entry in both markets is profitable only if E enters
market B in period 1:
∆A +∆B < fA + fB < ∆A + 2∆B.
In the absence of tying, E enters market B in period 1 and market
A in period 2, and then drives M out of the market. By tying the
two goods together, M reduces the profitability of E’s entering market
B, from 2∆B − fB > 0 to ∆B − fB < 0. Tying thus deters E from
entering market B, which allowsM to protect its position and maintain
its monopoly profit over the two periods.
Carlton and Waldman also point out that E may want to enter the
core market in order to get a larger share of its efficiency gain in the
adjacent market, rather than to exploit any efficiency gain in the core
market itself. In that case again, tying may block entry in both markets.
84That is, ρ = 1 in the previous notation.
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To see this, suppose now that: (i) when E enters market B only, in the
absence of tyingM appropriates a share λ of E’s efficiency gain; and (ii)
the following conditions hold:
∆A<fA < ∆A + λ∆B,
∆A +∆B <fA + fB < (1− λ)∆B +∆A +∆B.
The first set of conditions asserts that, while entry in A is not per se
profitable, it becomes profitable when it allows E to fully appropriate the
share of the technological gain ∆B thatM would otherwise appropriate;
thus, absent bundling, E enters both markets rather than market B
only. The second set of conditions asserts that, as before, entering both
markets in period 2 is not profitable whereas, absent bundling, entering
market B in period 1 and market A in period 2 is profitable. In such a
situation, tying the two goods blocks entry in both markets, since entry
then generates profits in the second period only.
The analyses of Choi and Stefanadis and of Carlton and Waldman
apply to industries where innovating in adjacent segments is sufficiently
costly: if E were to enter the B-market anyway, there would be no
point tying the two goods. For the sequential entry scenario, entry in
the core segment must moreover be sufficiently delayed that the entrant
does not want to incur the cost of entering the adjacent markets only; as
pointed out by Carlton and Waldman, the argument is therefore more
relevant when the core product A has both a long imitation lag (so
that tying reduces the profitability of entering the B-segment during a
significant amount of time) and a short lifetime (so that the profitability
of eventually entering both segments is limited).
Finally, it would be interesting to explore further the dynamics of
these models. If dominance and the strategic use of the multi-entry
problem lead to high incumbency profits, then there is a high incentive
to become the new incumbent.85 E may therefore decide to enter, even if
entry is unprofitable in the “short run” (period 2). It would therefore be
85For analyses of dynamic contestability in different environments, see Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000), Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988) and Segal and Whinston (2005).
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important to add periods 3,4,... to see if tying can still play a significant
role.
3.3 Innovation by the monopoly firm in the com-
petitive segment
It is sometimes argued that incumbent firms have an incentive to strate-
gically invest in R&D in adjacent markets, in order to discourage com-
petitive efforts (including innovation) by rival producers. On the face
of it, this concern seems at odds with the standard intuition that in-
novation is desirable, that competition should apply to the innovation
process as well as to manufacturing processes, and that intellectual prop-
erty should be protected. Forcing M to share its innovation with its B-
competitors might for example create an undesirable asymmetry in the
competitive process. First, sharing induces the independent B-suppliers
to free ride, reducing their R&D effort and probably product diversity.
Second, access policies of this type could imply a de facto line-of busi-
ness restriction, as M might stop engaging in innovations that would be
competed away (note, though, that from the Chicago school argument,
M still has some incentive to innovate even if it is forced to share the
resulting intellectual property, as improvements in the adjacent market
benefits M ’s core activity). Both arguments advocate protecting M ’s
rights over its innovation.
While this simple analysis is broadly correct, there is a twist, though,
that has been analyzed by Farrell and Katz (2000):86 R&D competition
in market B is affected by the presence of one of the competitors, M ,
in the adjacent market A. Suppose for the sake of argument that A
is sold on a stand-alone basis (a similar analysis applies to the case
in which M produces an input that is then used internally by its B-
division or sold to independent producers of good B). Then the value of
A is higher, the lower the quality-adjusted price of the product offered
(by M or its competitors) in segment B. This implies that M benefits
from innovation in market B in two ways: directly through sales of
component B if M ’s innovation in the B market is superior to those of
86See also Choi et al. (2002).
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its rivals; and indirectly through the increase in demand for good A —
and this even if M ’s B-component remains inferior to its rivals’. The
direct effect involves no asymmetry with B-market competitors, but the
indirect effect exists only for the multi-product firm.
To fix ideas, suppose for example that all B-competitors produce the
same good (no differentiation) and that innovations reduce production
costs in that market. The indirect or spillover effect is then clearly
identified when M ’s innovation in market B is dominated by a rival’s
innovation, in which case M makes no profit in the B-segment. In
that case, a small increase in the quality of M ’s innovation in market
B still leaves it dominated and thus does not generate any profit to
M ’s B-division. Yet it increases M ’s profit if it forces the efficient B-
rival to lower its price (squeezing quasi-rents from the independent B-
producer), and thereby boosts the demand for complementary good A.
This indirect effect takes another form when M ’s innovation in the B-
segment dominates its rivals’. Then, beyond the direct impact on market
B, a marginal increase in the quality of M ’s innovation increases the
demand for M ’s integrated solution (this is an example of the vertical
externality effect identified in section 2).
The spillover effect implies that M ’s R&D efforts in segment B are
higher than they would be if M ’s R&D division did not internalize the
profit in the A segment. In turn,M ’s enhanced R&D effort reduces that
of its rivals. As Farrell and Katz (2000) show, the overall welfare impact
of M ’s B-division internalizing M ’s A-division’s interests is ambiguous.
As usual, we should clarify the nature of the policy intervention that
is being contemplated. Short of imposing structural remedies, no an-
titrust decision will prevent M ’s B-division from internalizing the A-
division’s interests; hence, the above analysis may seem irrelevant as it
stands. One remedy that antitrust authorities may be tempted to adopt
consists in mandating M to share its innovation in market B for some
reasonably low licensing fee. This would not impact M ’s indirect bene-
fit of innovation, which would still exert pressure on B-competitors and
contribute to enhance demand for systems; however, this duty to share
would reduce the direct benefit of innovation on market B; innovation
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sharing thus reduces investments byM (and may eliminate them if there
are fixed costs of R&D), and raises investments by rivals, with poten-
tially detrimental welfare consequences, especially if M has substantial
R&D expertise and is likely to produce a superior innovation.
The ambiguity of the welfare analysis suggests that such antitrust
involvement is overall unlikely to foster innovation unless one demon-
strates that a) the reduction in independent B-producers’ R&D effort
due to M being vertically integrated more than offsets the increase in
that of M , and b) M ’s B-division can be effectively duplicated by en-
try in the B-market (e.g., through an effective divestiture and in the
absence of economies of scope). It is therefore not surprising that an-
titrust authorities have traditionally shunned direct intervention in the
competitive market.
Even if an analysis of this kind were used in a particular case as
the basis for anti-trust intervention, the resulting intervention would
run counter to the tradition of intellectual property law. That tradition
seeks to resolve the tension between the benefits of competition and the
protection of innovation by protecting the innovation from direct imita-
tion, while encouraging rival innovations. Indeed (as the analysis above
makes clear), while the quality of the best innovation determines the
gross benefits to consumers who purchase it, the price at which they
buy (and therefore the net benefits of the purchase) is determined by
the quality of the second-best innovation (this is the same phenomenon
as the fact that the price paid by the winner in an auction is determined
by the valuation of the second-highest bidder). Consequently an inno-
vation by rivals plays an important role in the process of keeping prices
low, a role that IP law has consistently sought to protect. By contrast,
intervention to restrict innovation by M in the B-segment would essen-
tially consist in removing one firm’s IP protection in order to protect the
innovation of another firm from post-innovation rivalry.
Choi (2002) analyzes the impact of tying, rather than integration as
such, on R&D incentives in the tied market. He considers a situation
where M has a monopoly position in market A and faces competition
in adjacent market B (goods A and B may, but need not be comple-
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ments).87 Choi starts from the observation that, in such a situation,
tying generally increases competition and lowers prices, but also allows
M to capture a larger share in the tied good market (as discussed in
section 3.1); as a result, tying tilts the R&D incentives in favor of M ;
tying can thus be interpreted as a credible commitment device to more
aggressive R&D investment by M , and can discourage rivals’ R&D in-
vestments. The change in R&D incentives allows M to increase its
profits in the future, and can thus make tying a profitable strategy even
if it intensifies competition in the short-term. The welfare implications
are again ambiguous, since in the short-run tying reduces prices but
restricts customer choice, and in the longer run it increases one firm’s
R&D incentives but reduces it rivals’.
3.4 Summary
Competition in the adjacent market brings product variety, lower costs
and lower prices. The Chicago School pointed out that competition in
that market thereby enhances the value of the bottleneck good and
boosts its owner’s profit when the bottleneck good is marketed on a
stand-alone basis and the two goods are complements. Bundling and
foreclosure therefore must be either efficiency-driven or motivated by
predatory intents. We reviewed two predation stories and hinted at
their strengths and limits. First, bundling may be a way of deterring
entry in (or inducing exit from) the adjacent market when goods are not
complements (at least for a substantial fraction of the users). Second,
bundling may allow a dominant firm to maintain its dominant position
in its bottleneck market.
Given that the motivations for bundling may be rather unrelated to
anti-competitive motives,88 and that most firms, dominant or not, bun-
dle goods and services on a routine basis, a rule of reason seems appropri-
87Relatedly, Choi (1996) considers the case where firms engage in a pre-emptive
patent race for systems (that is, firms compete for both components); he shows that
tying can mitigate the rent dissipation that can arise in such situations.
88Among them: distribution cost savings, compatibility cost savings, accountabil-
ity (liability, reputation) benefits, protection of intellectual property, market segmen-
tation and metering; we discuss these efficiency motives in section 5.
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ate. The issue for economists is then to guide competition authorities in
their handling of antitrust cases. To the extent that the anti-competitive
foreclosure theories reviewed in this section are in fine predation stories
(foreclosure in general leading, from the Chicago School argument, to a
short-term profit sacrifice by the tying firm, with the prospect of a later
recoupment), one possible approach is to treat tying cases through the
lens of predatory behavior.89 Whether one agrees with this viewpoint
or not, there is clearly a need for economists to come up with clearer
guidelines for the antitrust treatment of tying behaviors by dominant
firms.
4 Exclusive customer contracts
Following our definition of foreclosure, we have so far discussed alterna-
tive ways in which an incumbent firm may strategically use its market
power in one market in order to restrict competition in a related market.
In some situations, the incumbent may use this market power to protect
its position in the same market, even in the absence of interaction with
related markets. For example, a supplier that currently benefits from a
monopoly position may deter entry by locking customers into long-term
exclusive arrangements. However, a Chicago critique again applies: cus-
tomers should be reluctant to agree to such exclusive arrangements and
should demand an appropriate compensation, that would dissipate the
profitability of these arrangements.
To see this more precisely, suppose that an incumbent monopolist,
M , faces a customer, C. This user is willing to buy one unit, which costs
c and brings a gross surplus of S; and assume that a potential entrant
E can enter with a lower cost cˆ ≤ c and generate a higher surplus
Sˆ ≥ S. In the absence of entry, M could exploit its monopoly position,
charge a price of S and thus get S − c in profit. If instead entry occurs,
competition drives the price down to c +
³
Sˆ − S
´
; consumers then get
a net surplus S − c, while E earns ∆ = Sˆ − S + c − cˆ and M is out of
the market.
89For a discussion of the costs and benefits of this approach, see Tirole (2005) and
the comments thereupon by Carlton and Waldman and by Nalebuff.
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To prevent entry,M could try to lock-in the user through an exclusive
contract. To capture this possibility, consider for example the following
two-stage game:
• in the first stage, the incumbent offers C an exclusive contract at
a given price p;
• in the second stage, if the exclusive contract has been accepted,
C buys from M at price p; otherwise, E chooses whether to enter
and then compete with M as above.
In the first stage, C anticipates that it will no longer benefit from
competition if it signs an exclusive contract; thus, C does not accept
an exclusive contract at a price p higher than c (which gives him the
“competitive” surplus of S−c), so that such an exclusive contract cannot
be profitable for M .
4.1 Exclusionary clauses as a rent-extraction device
Recognizing this issue, Aghion and Bolton (1987) pointed out that M
could still use exclusive contracts in order to extract some of the entrant’s
technological advantage, ∆. For example, consider the following penalty
contract: C buys from M at price p, or else must pay a penalty for
breach d to M .90 Then, in order to attract C, E must offer a price pˆ
such that pˆ+ d ≤ p+ Sˆ − S, or
pˆ ≤
³
p+ Sˆ − S
´
− d.
That is, the penalty for breach d is actually paid by E, and thus plays
the role of an entry fee. It is then optimal for M to set d so as to
reap the entrant’s technological advantage. For example, the contract
(p = c, d = ∆) forces the entrant to offer a price pˆ = cˆ, thus allowing M
to appropriate ∆.
In this simple example, M can fine-tune the penalty for breach so
as to extract the entire efficiency gain of the entrant, and thus entry
90An alternative interpretation of this contract is that C pays d for the option of
buying a unit at a price p− d.
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occurs whenever it is efficient. The penalty for breach may discourage
the entrant from investing in the new technology, though. Furthermore,
Aghion and Bolton point out that, in practice, there may be some uncer-
tainty about the entrant’s technological superiority; in that case, max-
imizing its expected profit, the incumbent takes the risk of foreclosing
entry if E is not much more efficient than M , so as to extract more of
the efficiency gains when E has a large technological advantage.
Example. Suppose that (i) E faces initially an uncertain cost (the
same logic would apply to uncertainty about the quality advantage);
and (ii), M and C sign a contract before this uncertainty is resolved.
Once the cost cˆ is realized, E decides whether to enter the market, in
which case it incurs an infinitesimal fixed cost of entry.91 If for example
Sˆ = S = 1, c = 1/2 and cˆ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1], in the
absence of any exclusivity entry occurs whenever cˆ < 1/2: if cˆ ≥ 1/2, E
does not enter and M earns S − c = 1/2 while if cˆ < 1/2, E enters and
earns cˆ − c; since entry occurs with probability 1/2, and E’s expected
cost is 1/4 in case of entry,M ’s and E’s expected profits are respectively
1/4 and 1/8. Now, suppose thatM and C could levy a (non-contingent)
entry fee f from E, and share the proceeds as desired; entry would then
only occur when cˆ+ f ≤ c, thus with probability (1/2− f). Since entry
per se does not affect M and C’s total surplus (since E appropriates
all the gain from its cost advantage when it enters), M and C would
maximize the expected revenue from the fee, (1/2− f) f and thus choose
f = 1/4, generating in this way an extra expected gain of 1/16; entry
would thus be restricted, and would only occur when cˆ ≤ 1/4. But M
and C can precisely achieve this outcome be signing a penalty contract
of the form (p = 3/4, d = 1/2). Indeed, with this contract C is assured to
pay no more than 3/4 and thus earns the same expected profit as in the
absence of exclusivity (1/4), while E only enters when cˆ ≤ p− d = 1/4
and M earns either p − c = 1/4 in the absence of entry or d = 1/2 in
91This assumption ensures that E enters only if it can earn a positive profit. In
the absence of any fixed cost, E would always “enter” the market and exert pressure
on M ; the analysis would be similar, in the sense that M ’s exclusionary behavior
would lead to production inefficiency (that is, E may not supply C although it is
more efficient than M).
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case of entry. This contract thus replicates the optimal entry fee; entry
is again restricted, while M ’s expected profit is increased by 1/16.92
Renegotiation. That exclusive contracts (in the form of a penalty for
breach) have an exclusionary impact relies on the assumption that M
and C cannot renegotiate their contract (say, M would forgive some of
the penalty for breach) once E has made an offer. Otherwise, whenever
this offer generates a surplus higher than S − c, M and C would indeed
renegotiate the terms of their contract (say,M would forgive some of the
penalty for breach) so as to benefit from E’s offer. Given this, E would
and could enter whenever entry is efficient. This point is recognized
by Spier and Whinston (1995), who however emphasize that M may
still have an incentive to block entry by over-investing in improving its
own technology: by doing so, M forces E to concede a better deal;
this strategic benefit can then be shared by M and C, e.g. through a
lump-sum transfer in their initial contract.93
To see this more precisely, suppose for simplicity thatM and E only
differ in their costs of production
³
Sˆ = S
´
and consider the following
timing:
(i) M offers an exclusive contract at a stipulated price of p, which C
accepts or refuses.
(ii) M decides whether to invest in its technology: investing I reduces
M ’s cost from c = c to c = c; M ’s investment decision and/or
actual cost is publicly observed.
(iii) E’s cost cˆ is drawn from a distribution over [0, S] and publicly
observed; E then sets its price, pˆ.
92While M gets here the entire revenue from the fee, this revenue could be redis-
buted to C through a simultaneous reduction in p and d.
93The general issue here is the commitment value of a contract that can be renego-
tiated later on. Katz (1991) and Caillaud et al. (1995) point out that such a contract
may still involve some commitment when the relationship is subject to agency prob-
lems — e.g., in the form of moral hazard or adverse selection. See Caillaud and Rey
(1995) for an introduction to this literature. In Spier and Whinston’s model, there
is indeed “moral hazard” since signing an exclusive agreement affects M ’s incentives
to invest in its own technology.
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(iv) M and C can renegotiate their initial agreement (or sign one ifM ’s
first offer had been rejected); we assume that M and C bargain
efficiently — as we will see, the division of the gains from trade is
however irrelevant.
(v) C chooses its supplier.
Suppose that C accepts an exclusive contract with a stipulated price
p ≤ S. At stages (iv) and (v), either there is no renegotiation and C
buys from M at p (this occurs if pˆ > c, since there is then no gain from
renegotiation) or renegotiates the exclusivity agreement (if pˆ ≤ c).94
Anticipating this, at stage (iii) E does not enter if cˆ > c, otherwise it
enters and quotes a price equal to c, leading M and C to renegotiate
their initial agreement while minimizing their gains from renegotiation.95
Therefore, entry occurs whenever it is efficient, given M ’s cost level, c.
However, under an exclusive contract,M ’s ex post payoff is p−c, with or
without renegotiation: C must buy at price p absent any renegotiation,
and when renegotiation takes place, E leaves (almost) no gain from it,
implying thatM gets again p− c. This, in turn, implies thatM chooses
to invest whenever
c− c > I.
By contrast, M ’s investment is socially desirable only ifh
1− Fˆ (c)
i
(c− c) +
Z c
c
(cˆ− c) dFˆ (cˆ) > I,
where Fˆ denotes the cumulative distribution of E’s cost. Note that the
social benefit, which appears on the left-hand side of the above inequal-
ity, is lower than c − c; therefore, exclusivity leads to over-investment
relative to what would be socially desirable, wheneverh
1− Fˆ (c)
i
(c− c) +
Z c
c
(cˆ− c) dFˆ (cˆ) < I < c− c.
94Technically, there is no need for renegotiation when pˆ = c. To avoid an “openess”
problem, however, we assume that M and C then take E’s offer.
95This is why the relative bargaining power of M and C is irrelevant, as long as
they bargain efficiently. Since it is strictly desirable for the two parties to renegotiate
as long as pˆ < c, by setting a price (close to) pˆ = c, E induces renegotiation but
actually appropriates (almost) all of the gains from it.
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In that case, after signing up a customer into a (renegotiable) exclusivity
contract, M invests in its technology in order not only to reduce its cost
when E is inefficient, but also to force E to offer a better price (c instead
of c) when it efficient; this, however, implies that E enters less often than
it would if M did not invest in its technology (E no longer enters when
c < cˆ < c).96
More generally, exclusivity contracts in which downstream customers
commit to purchase from an upstream supplier have the potential to de-
ter investments by competing upstream suppliers. In Aghion and Bolton
(1987), these investments take the form of an all-or-nothing entry deci-
sion. But the investment choice may more generally refer to an invest-
ment scale. In Stefanadis (1997), two upstream firms compete in the
R&D market to obtain a patent on a process innovation that reduces
the marginal cost of supplying the input. An exclusive contract with a
downstream customer reduces the profitability of R&D for the upstream
rival, and therefore the rival’s R&D effort. In equilibrium, upstream
firms lock in customers through exclusive contracts in order to reduce
their rival’s R&D expenditures in the subsequent innovation markets.
4.2 Scale economies and users’ coordination failure
In a second contribution in the same paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987)
also point out that the incumbent supplier, M , can play customers
against each other in other to deter the entry of a more efficient competi-
tor. While Aghion and Bolton’s original analysis relies on commitment
to conditional contracts97 that may be difficult to implement (e.g., be-
cause of legal restrictions), Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whin-
ston (2000) have shown that their insight is robust in the presence of
scale economies.98 To see this, suppose for example that there are n cus-
96WhetherM would invest in the absence of any initial agreement depends, among
other things, on the price that E charges when it is less efficient than M and on C’s
ex post bargaining power. Spier and Whinston (1995) however confirm that M ’s
incentive to invest (and thus limit entry) is maximal under exclusivity.
97Aghion and Bolton assumed that M could commit itself to charge prices that
are conditional on how many customers accept exclusivity.
98Rasmusen et al. (1991) meant to focus on nondiscriminatory contracts but actu-
ally assume some form of discrimination. Segal and Whinston (2000) clarify this issue
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tomers and that entry is viable only if E can sign up at least m+1 < n
customers.M can therefore block entry by “bribing” a targeted group of
n−m customers into exclusive arrangements, by sharing the rents it gets
from exploiting its monopoly power vis-à-vis the remainingm customers.
This strategy is clearly successful when the monopoly rents exceed the
benefits that the targeted customers can hope to derive together from
free entry.
Even if this condition does not hold, however,M can still successfully
deter entry by “playing customers against each other”, that is, by relying
on poor coordination among the customers: while customers may be
better off if all reject exclusivity, they may fail to coordinate and accept
exclusivity if they anticipate that the others will do — M may then not
even need to bribe any customer.
Segal and Whinston (2000) stress that M ’s ability to discriminate
among customers enhances the scope for successful exclusion. Without
discrimination, M would fail to deter the entry of an equally efficient
competitor if customers coordinate — even only tacitly — on their fa-
vored equilibrium. By contrast, with discriminatory offers the above-
mentioned scheme may succeed even if customers can explicitly coordi-
nate their buying decisions.99
A related insight is obtained by Bernheim and Whinston (1998),
who study a situation in which two suppliers compete sequentially for
two customers. Bernheim and Whinston in particular show that the
first customer may strategically choose to “exclude” one supplier so as
to share with the other supplier the additional profits from its enhanced
bargaining position vis-à-vis the second customer. To see this more
precisely, consider the following framework:
• M and E simultaneously offer a contract to a first customer, C1;
as well as the respective role of discriminatory offers and of customers’ coordination
problems.
99This scheme is an example of “divide-and-conquer” strategies that were initially
explored by Innes and Sexton (1994). Fumagalli and Motta (2005) stress however that
such strategies are more difficult to implement when buyers are competing against
each other, since then it is more difficult to compensate a deviant buyer who wants
to buy from the more efficient entrant.
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each contract can be conditional on exclusivity (that is, it can
stipulate different terms, depending on whether C1 contracts with
the other supplier as well). C1 then accepts or rejects each offer; if
C1 buys a positive quantity from E (exclusively or not), E enters
and incurs a fixed cost f ;
• Then, M and E offer conditional contracts to a second customer,
C2; there again, contracts can be conditional on exclusivity and C2
then chooses its supplier(s).
The payoffs are as follows. Let Si denote the surplus that Ci can
generate from dealing with bothM and E (assuming that E enters) and
SMi and SEi the surplus that Ci generates when dealing with M or E
only. We assume that M and E offer partial substitutes:
SMi + S
E
i > Si
¡
> SMi , S
E
i > 0
¢
.
We will moreover assume that E’s entry is socially efficient; that is,
S > SM ,
where
S ≡ S1 + S2 − f
denotes the total net surplus generated by the two suppliers and
SM ≡ SM1 + SM2
denotes the total surplus generated by M only.
Consider now the last stage of the game. Bernheim and Whinston
show that, while this “common agency subgame” may involve both ex-
clusive and nonexclusive equilibria, there is a Pareto-dominant equilib-
rium (for the suppliers); this equilibrium maximizes the joint surplus of
the suppliers and the customer. If E entered the market, the equilib-
rium involves no exclusivity and each supplier gets its “contribution” to
the total surplus; that is, M gets S2 − SE2 , while E gets S2 − SM2 .100 If
100The condition S2 − SM2 < f would thus ensure that E does not want to enter
when it fails to deal with C1.
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instead E did not enter, then M enjoys a monopoly position and gets
SM2 .
Consider now the first stage. The same logic prevails, except that the
relevant surpluses account for the suppliers’ payoffs in the subsequent
contracting stage. Thus, if C1 chooses to deal with E (exclusively or
not), E enters and the joint surplus of M , E and C1 is given by
Sˆ ≡ S1 +
¡
S2 − SE2
¢
+
¡
S2 − SM2 − f
¢
;
the substitutability between the two suppliers implies that Sˆ is smaller
than the total surplus S. If this substitutability is large enough, Sˆ may
be even smaller than SM , the surplus generated byM . In this case, while
entry would be efficient
¡
since S > SM
¢
, the outcome of the first stage is
that C1 deals exclusively withM , so as to makeM the monopoly supplier
of C2. That is, taking into account M ’s monopoly profit on C2, M and
C1 can together generate more profits by excluding E, even if they could
extract all of E’s contribution to their joint surplus. Exclusive dealing
then emerges as an anti-competitive device against (E and) C2. The
argument relies again on some form of coordination failure between the
customers: if the two customers could side-contract, C2 would be willing
to compensate C1 for opting for a non-exclusive relationship with M .
4.3 Summary
The Coasian or commitment theory of foreclosure reviewed in section 2
insisted on the detrimental impact of downstream competition on up-
stream profit. To avoid the erosion of profit, downstream access to the
upstream bottleneck was reduced relative to what would be socially op-
timal (assuming the very existence of this upstream bottleneck). By con-
trast, in the theories reviewed in this section, downstream users (who
do not compete against each other) in a sense receive “too much” access
to the bottleneck. In the rent-extraction theory, penalties for breach are
used to force a more efficient upstream entrant to reduce its price; in
the entry-deterrence theory, penalties for breach expose customers to a
free-riding problem when the entrant faces a large fixed cost of entry
and therefore needs a broad and profitable enough market in order to
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become a competitive threat. Either way, long-term contracts may create
inefficiencies.
We have only touched on the issues associated with penalties for
breach and dynamic price discrimination. More general approaches are
surveyed by Armstrong (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2005) and
Stole (2003). Also, to draw tentative guidelines such as the ones that are
currently debated for the application of European Article 82 on abuses of
dominance, one needs to discuss possible efficiency defenses; we review
some of them in the next section.
5 Potential defenses for exclusionary behaviors
Vertical or horizontal foreclosure may be socially beneficial in certain cir-
cumstances. First, it may enhance innovators’ benefit from R&D efforts
and thus foster their incentives to innovate or develop new products.
Second, in situations where unrestrained competition in downstream or
adjacent markets leads to excessive entry and duplication of fixed costs,
foreclosure may help reducing excessive entry. Finally, integration may
improve coordination between firms, for example by providing better
incentives to monitor their efforts; foreclosure then is an undesired by-
product of a useful institution. We briefly examine these defenses in turn.
For expositional purposes we first focus on defenses that are relevant for
vertical foreclosure, although some of them apply as well to horizontal
foreclosure; we then turn to defenses that are specific to tying.
a) Efficiency arguments for (vertical) foreclosure
— Forbearance as a reward to investment or innovation. The antitrust
authorities may refrain from prosecuting foreclosure activities because
the monopoly position thus obtained compensates the bottleneck for its
investment or innovative activity. This efficiency defense is similar to
the logic underlying the patent system — as already noted, a prospective
licensee would not pay much for using a new technology if it anticipates
the licensor to “flood the market” with licensees. In both cases society
is willing to tolerate static inefficiency, such as monopoly pricing, in
order to promote dynamic efficiency. The same issue as for patents
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then arises: To what extent is forbearance an optimal mechanism for
providing innovators with a rent? As recognized in Aspen, one cannot
impose a general duty to deal with competitors. And even when such
a duty is warranted, it would be unreasonable to mandate competitors’
access to each and every aspect of a firm’s activity on an unbundled
basis.
Our discussion suggests one plausible dividing line to answer the
question of when it is most desirable to force access: Is the origin of the
bottleneck increasing returns to scale or scope (as may be the case of a
bridge, a stadium, or a news agency) or an historical accident? Or does
the bottleneck result from an innovative strategy? Intervention to avoid
foreclosure and consequently to reduce the bottleneck profit seems more
warranted in the former than in the latter case.
— Free-riding by the downstream units on the marketing expenses of
the upstream firm. This argument states that the upstream firmmust be
able to recoup marketing expenses that will benefit downstream units.
This argument is related to the above argument of forbearance as a
reward to investment (see the discussion of Chemla’s work in Appendix
A.2).
— Excessive entry. Entry typically involves significant fixed costs,
and excessive entry can therefore result in an inefficient duplication of
these costs. In the absence of foreclosure, excessive entry can indeed oc-
cur due to the so-called “business-stealing” effect: when contemplating
entering the market, a firm does not take into account that its prospec-
tive customers will in part simply switch away from existing products;
the revenue generated by its product may thus exceed its social value.101
In this context, foreclosure may be socially desirable when the duplica-
tion of the fixed cost is particularly harmful, and vertical or horizontal
integration may yield a socially better outcome than no integration. We
provide in Appendix B a short analysis of this issue using our vertical
101See Salop (1979) and Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for detailed analyses of this
issue.
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foreclosure framework.102 The validity of this argument may however be
difficult to assess in practice, since the characterization of the socially
optimal number of firms is generally a complex matter.
— Monitoring benefits of vertical integration. Benefits of vertical
integration are often mentioned as efficiency defenses. For example,
control of a supplier by one of the buyers may put someone in charge of
making sure that the technological choices of the supplier are in the best
interest of the buyers. To be certain, the integrated buyer may then use
its control right over the supplier to engage in nonprice foreclosure, for
instance by insisting on technological specifications that are biased in its
favor. And, as in this paper, it may overcharge the buyers while keeping
an internal transfer price equal to marginal cost and thus practice price
foreclosure. These foreclosure practices are then arguably an undesirable
by-product of an otherwise desirable activity, namely monitoring.
— Costly divestitures. Antitrust enforcers and regulators are often
reluctant to force vertical separation because of the disruptive cost of
disentangling deeply intertwined activities. That is, even if they would
have prohibited the merger of two vertically-related firms, they do not
order a divestiture when faced with the fait accompli of vertical integra-
tion.
— Costly expansion of capacity or the costs incurred in order to pro-
vide access. We have assumed that the cost of supplying competitors
of a vertically integrated firm is the same as the cost of internal pur-
chases. In practice, the former may exceed the latter, either because
upstream decreasing returns to scale make marginal units more costly
to supply than inframarginal ones, or because there is a genuine asym-
102See Vickers (1995) for a related analysis of the relative cost and benefits of
vertical integration in the context of a regulated upstream monopolist in which the
regulator (i) controls the upstream firm’s price but not its profit, (ii) operates direct
transfers to the firm and (iii) has no statutory power to regulate downstream entry.
In this context, vertical integration leads to a higher (regulated) access price (since
it is more difficult to extract the information from the integrated firm, the incentive
scheme must be more high-powered, resulting in a higher access charge) but less
duplication of fixed cost (because of foreclosure).
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metry between the costs of supplying the downstream affiliate and its
competitors, due for example to compatibility costs. In essence, this
efficiency defense amounts to saying that there is no foreclosure because
discrimination among competitors is cost-based.
— Fear of being associated with inferior downstream partners who
might hurt the firm’s reputation. We have assumed that the only nega-
tive externality of supply by a downstream firm on the other downstream
firms and thus indirectly on the upstream bottleneck is price mediated.
That is, downstream entry depresses the final price and thus the industry
profit; but it increases social welfare. There may be some other negative
externalities on the upstream firm that are less socially desirable. In
particular, misbehavior by a downstream firm may spoil the reputation
of other downstream firms and of the upstream bottleneck. This ar-
gument, which relies on the existence of monitoring of the downstream
firms, is often invoked for example in a franchising context, and used to
justify strict quality controls.
— Universal service. It is sometimes argued that universal service
obligations imposed by the regulator or the law should be compensated
by a greater leniency vis-a-vis foreclosing behaviors — see, e.g., the 1993
decision of the European Commission in Corbeau (Decision C 320/91 ).
This argument is simply a variant of the general argument that fixed
costs must be recouped by market power in some market. And again one
must wonder whether foreclosure is the most efficient means of creating
market power.103
b) Efficiency arguments for tying
As we said earlier, some of the defenses listed above apply also in the
horizontal context. Others are specific to that context. The most obvious
such defense is the distribution cost savings associated with marketing
two products together instead of separately. Other standard defenses of
103There is a further debate as to whether universal service should be financed
through mark-ups on specific segments, as opposed to the policy of creating a com-
petitively neutral universal service fund financing universal service through industry-
wide taxes.
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tying include:
— Preventing inefficient substitution. When two separately mar-
keted goods are combined in variable proportions, market power over
one good distorts customers’ choices over the relative use of the two
goods.104 Consider for example a monopolist that produces a durable
good, for which maintenance and repair services can be supplied by
independent providers. If the monopolist prices its original equipment
above (marginal) cost while maintenance is priced at cost, customers rely
excessively on maintenance and replace their equipment insufficiently of-
ten. By tying the aftermarket services to the original purchase of the
equipment, the monopolist generates more efficient replacement deci-
sions, which improves social welfare. A similar argument applies when
there is competition among original equipment manufacturers and cus-
tomers face switching costs — in that case, tying can also improve both
social and consumer welfare.105
— Metering. Relatedly, tying consumables may allow a supplier
to meter usage and thus discriminate between high- and low-intensity
users.106 While such third-degree price discrimination has in general am-
biguous welfare implications,107 it can allow the supplier to recoup large
investments and foster incentives to develop new products.
— Signalling quality. Tying consumables to the sale of the original
equipment can give a high-quality seller an effective tool for signaling
the quality of its product, when quality is not readily observable to buy-
ers.108 Indeed, if the manufacturer charges usage (through the tied con-
104See Vernon and Graham (1971), Schmalensee (1973), Su (1975), Warren-Boulton
(1974) and Rust (1986).
105See Carlton and Waldman (2001), who further stress that monopolizing the used
parts markets can be efficient when the supplier of the original equipment is also in
the best position for re-manufacturing used parts into replacement parts.
106In Chicken Delight (1971), for example, the franchisor used packing items to
measure the volume of activity of its franchisees; the franchisor’s mark-up over the
packing items then implemented a reliable revenue-sharing scheme. See Chen and
Ross (1993) and (1999) for applications to aftermarket services with, respectively,
monopolistic and competitive manufacturers.
107See Katz (1987) and Tirole (1988).
108See Schwartz and Werden (1996).
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sumables) rather than the initial purchase of the equipment, consumers
then “pay” for the equipment only if they really use it, once they have
found out its true quality.
6 Concluding remarks
Despite recent advances, some progress must still be made in order to
better anchor the concept of foreclosure within the broader antitrust
doctrine. First, a better integration between theory and applications
should be achieved. This chapter has offered some guiding principles for
thinking about the incentives for, and the feasibility and welfare implica-
tions of foreclosure. The link could be further strengthened. Relatedly,
further empirical investigations will allow us to get a better feel for the
magnitude of the effects involved and to assess the relevance of not only
the scope for foreclosure, but also the theoretical factors affecting this
scope (such as the competitiveness of upstream segments, the availability
of alternative foreclosure strategies, or the location of the bottleneck).
In our discussion of efficiency defenses we hinted at some considera-
tions calling for a milder antitrust treatment of exclusionary behavior, as
when the bottleneck results from innovation or investment rather than
returns to scale or scope, legal and regulatory interventions, or historical
accident. Still, this discussion of efficiency defenses was somewhat of an
addendum to the treatment of the anticompetitive effect, and the two
should be better integrated.
This call for a unified treatment actually does not solely apply to the-
ory. Indeed, the legal and regulatory framework exhibits, as we noted,
a remarkable dichotomy between the treatment of intellectual property
in which the practice of foreclosure is widely viewed as acceptable (ex-
cept for some recent pushes for compulsory licensing and open access in
certain contexts) and other areas in which foreclosure is systematically
viewed as socially detrimental. We have shown that the broad concep-
tual framework is the same, and offered guiding principles as to when
foreclosure should be opposed or tolerated.
While we have tried to provide a comprehensive theoretical treat-
ment within the confines of the topic of this paper, it would be desirable
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to broaden the scope of analysis in several directions. More complex
forms of essential facilities have emerged, and corresponding theoretical
frameworks should be developed. First, in markets such as telecommuni-
cations or the Internet, in which final consumers interact with each other
through the mediation of the platforms’ operator they are connected to,
bottlenecks are endogenous in that they depend on the outcome of the
“downstream” competition for consumers (by contrast, in our analysis,
the bottleneck pre-exists downstream competition). Namely, each oper-
ator must rely on its competitors to terminate the connections initiated
by their own consumers.109 This competitive bottleneck problem, in
which each operator needs access to its rivals’ customers, exhibits many
new and interesting features.110 For example, an operator can reduce
its need for access to a bottleneck it does not control by gaining market
share and “internalizing” the interactions demanded by its customers.
Furthermore, small players have more, rather than less, market power
than big players in the wholesale market, provided that the latter are
forced to interoperate; for, all players have the same — full monopoly
— power on terminations toward their customers, and small players can
demand very high termination prices without moving final prices much.
Bottlenecks that are governed by a cooperative arrangement rather
than owned by a single entity would also deserve a full treatment on
their own. Such bottlenecks can result from a desire to reap economies
of scale, as in the case of a credit card or agricultural cooperative, or to
eliminate multiple marginalization and offer a one-stop-shopping facility,
as in the case of patent pools and joint marketing agreements. They can
be run as for-profit entities or as not-for-profit associations. They raise
interesting questions about the extent of access that should be granted to
customers and for potential members. The previous considerations as to
where the bottleneck nature comes from are relevant here as well. So, for
109Unless consumers “multi-home” on several platforms, a topic that has been stud-
ied only recently — see, e.g. Rochet and Tirole (2003).
110See e.g. Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a,b) for early analyses of
telecommunications networks competition in a deregulated environment. More recent
developments and further references to the subsequent literature can be found in
Armstrong (2002), Laffont et al. (2003) and Jeon et al. (2004).
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example, a bottleneck created by economies of scale should in principle
grant broad access, as long as this access does not amount to pure free
riding on investments (financial and informational-learning) made by
previous members. But the joint provision of the bottleneck gives rise
to new questions such as the impact of new members on the governance
of the bottleneck (with the possibility that dissonant objectives may
hamper the functioning and reduce the efficiency of the bottleneck). We
leave these and other fascinating issues for further research.
82
References
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton (1987), “Contracts as
a Barrier to Entry”, American Economic Review 77:388—
401.
Ahern, Patrick J. (1994), “Refusal to Deal after Aspen”, An-
titrust Law Journal 63:153—184.
Areeda, Phillip (1981), Antitrust Analysis, Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, third edition.
Armstrong, Mark (1998), “Network Interconnection in Telecom-
munications”, Economic Journal, 108, 545-564.
Armstrong, Mark (2002), “The Theory of Access Pricing and
Interconnection”, in M. Cave, S. Majumdar, and I. Vo-
gelsang, eds, Handbook of Telecommunication Economics,
vol. I (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
Armstrong, Mark (2005), “Recent Developments in the Eco-
nomics of Price Discrimination”, mimeo, University Col-
lege London.
Armstrong, Mark and David Sappington (2003), “Recent De-
velopments in the Theory of Regulation”, in M. Arm-
strong and Robert S. Porter, eds, Handbook of Industrial
Organization, vol. III (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
Back, Kerry, and Jaime Zender (1993), “Auctions of Divisible
Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment”,
Review of Financial Studies 6:733—764.
Baumol, William, Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig (1995),
“Notes on the Efficient Component Pricing Rule”, paper
given at the Montreal Conference on Regulated Indus-
tries.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Michael D. Whinston (1986),
“Common Agency”, Econometrica 54:923—942.
83
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Michael D. Whinston (1998),
“Exclusive Dealing”, Journal of Political Economy 106:64-
103.
Bolton, Patrick and Michael Whinston (1993), “Incomplete
Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance”,
Review of Economic Studies 60:121—148.
Borenstein, Severin, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason and Janet
S. Netz (1995), “Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets”, An-
titrust Law Journal 63:455—482.
Bork, Robert (1978), Antitrust Paradox, New York: Basic
Books.
Bowman, Ward S. Jr. (1957), “Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem”, Yale Law Journal 67:19—36.
Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi (1998),
“Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Share-
holders”, Journal of Political Economy 106:172-204.
Caillaud, Bernard, and Patrick Rey (1995), “Strategic As-
pects of Delegation”, European economic Review 39: 421-
431.
Caillaud, Bernard, Bruno Jullien and Pierre Picard (1995)
“Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Rene-
gotiation”, Econometrica 63(3):621-646.
Caprice, Stéphane (2005a), “Incentive to Encourage Down-
streamCompetition under Bilateral Oligopoly”, Economics
Bulletin 12(9):1-5.
Caprice, Stéphane (2005b), “Multilateral vertical contracting
with an alternative supplier: Discrimination and Nondis-
crimination”, INRA-ESR Working Paper 2005-03.
Carlton, Dennis W., and Michael Waldman (2001), “Com-
petition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets”, NBER Working
Paper 8086.
84
Carlton, Dennis W., and Michael Waldman (2002), “The
Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market
Power in Evolving Industries”, Rand Journal of Economics
33:194-220.
Cestone, Giacinta and LucyWhite (2003), “Anti-Competitive
Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims’,
Journal of Finance 58(5):2109-2141.
Chemla, Gilles (2003), “Downstream Competition, Foreclo-
sure and Vertical Integration”, Journal of Economics,
Management & Strategy 12:261-289.
Chen, Yongmin and Michael H. Riordan (2004), “Vertical In-
tegration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization”,
mimeo, Columbia University.
Chen, Zhiqi and Thomas Ross (1993), “Refusal to Deal, Price
Discrimination and Independent Service Organizations”,
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2(4):593-
614
Chen, Zhiqi and Thomas Ross (1999), “Refusal to Deal and
Orders to Supply in Competitive Markets”, International
Journal of Industrial Organization 17:399-417.
Chipty, Tasneen (2001), “Vertical Integration, Market Fore-
closure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television
Industry”, American Economic Review 91(3):428-453.
Choi, Jay Pil (1996), “Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation,
and "leverage theory"”, The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 110:1153-1181.
Choi, Jay Pil (2001), “A Theory of Mixed Bundling Applied
to the GE-Honeywell Merger”, Antitrust, Fall:32-33.
Choi, Jay Pil (2004), “Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic
Analysis of Tying Arrangements”, Economic Journal 114:83-
101.
85
Choi, Jay Pil, Gwanghoon Lee and Christodoulos Stefanadis
(2003), “The Effects of Integration on R&D Incentives in
Systems Markets”, Netnomics 5(1):21-32.
Choi, Jay Pil and Christodoulos Stefanadis (2001), “Tying,
Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory”, Rand
Journal of Economics 32(1):52-71.
Choi, Jay Pil and Sang-Seung Yi (2000), “Vertical Foreclo-
sure with the Choice of Input Specifications”, Rand Jour-
nal of Economics 30:717-743.
Coase, Ronald (1972), “Durability and Monopoly”, Journal
of Law & Economics 15:143.
Comanor, William S. and Patrick Rey (2000), “Vertical Re-
straints and the Market Power of Large Distributors”,
Review of Industrial Organization 17(2):135-153.
de Fontenay, Catherine C., and Joshua S. Gans (2005), “Ver-
tical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competi-
tion”, Rand Journal of Economics 36(3):544-572.
DeGraba, Patrick (1996), “Most-Favored-Customer Clauses
and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination
Implies Uniformity”, Journal of Economics & Manage-
ment Strategy”, 5:565—579.
Economides, Nicholas.(1989), “The Desirability of Compati-
bility in the Absence of Network Externalities”, American
Economic Review 71(5):1165-1181.
Evans, David, Andrei Hagiu and Richard Schmalensee (2005),
Apple to Zoomer: How Software Platforms Drive Inno-
vation and Transform Industry, book draft.
Farrell, Joseph and Nancy T. Gallini (1988), “Second-Sourcing
as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Com-
petition”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103:673-
694.
86
Farrell, Joseph and Michael Katz (2000), “Innovation, Rent
Extraction and Integration in Systems Markets”, Journal
of Industrial Economics 48(4):413-432.
Farrell, Joseph and Paul Klemperer (2006), “Co-ordination
and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Net-
work Effects”, in M. Armstrong and Robert S. Porter,
eds, Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. III (North-
Holland, Amsterdam).
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof, and Johan Stenneck (2003), “Why
Event Studies Do Not Detect the Competitive Effects of
Mergers — The Out of Play Effect”, mimeo, Research In-
stitute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (2000), “Pricing Under the
Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good”,
Journal of Industrial Economics 48(4): 373-390.
Fudenberg, Drew and Miguel Villas-Boas (2005), “Behavior-
Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition”,
mimeo, Harvard University and UC Berkeley.
Fumagalli, Chiara and Massimo Motta (2005), “Exclusive
Dealing and Entry: When Buyers Compete”, American
Economic Review, forthcoming.
Garcia Mariñoso, Begoña (2001), “Technological Incompati-
bility, Endogenous Switching Costs and Lock-in”, Journal
of Industrial Economics 49(3):281-298.
Gaudet, Gérard and Nyo Van Long (1996), “Vertical Inte-
gration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double
Marginalisation”, Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 5:409—432.
Gilbert, Richard, Karsten Neuhoff and David Newbery (2004),
“Allocating Transmission to Mitigate Market Power in
ElectricityMarkets”, Rand Journal of Economics 35(4):691-
709.
87
Green, Richard and David Newbery (1992), “Competition in
the British Electricity Spot Market”, Journal of Political
Economy 100:929—953.
Hancher, Leigh (1995), “European Competition Law Impli-
cations for Access Pricing. Report for European Com-
mission DGIV”, mimeo, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Hart, Oliver and Jean Tirole (1990), “Vertical Integration
and Market Foreclosure”, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity (Microeconomics) 205-285.
Innes, Robert and Richard J. Sexton (1994), “Strategic Buy-
ers and Exclusionary Contracts”, American Economic Re-
view 84(3):566-584.
Jeon, Doh-Shin, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (2004),
“On the Receiver Pays Principle”, Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics 35:85-110.
Joskow, Paul and Jean Tirole (2000), “Transmission Rights
and Market Power on Electric Power Networks”, Rand
Journal of Economics 31:450-487.
Katz, Michael (1986), “Technology Adoption in the Presence
of Network Externalities”, Journal of Political Economy
94:822-841.
Katz, Michael (1987), “The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree
Price Discrimination in Intermediate GoodsMarket”,Amer-
ican Economic Review 77:154-167.
Katz, Michael (1989), “Vertical Contractual Relations”, in
Richard. Schmalensee and Robert Willig eds, Handbook
of Industrial Organization, vol. I, (North Holland, Ams-
terdam).
Katz, Michael (1991), “Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable
contracts as Precommitments”, Rand Journal of Economics
22-3:307-328.
88
Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro (1985), “On the Licensing
of Innovations”, Rand Journal of Economics 16:504—520.
Kende, Michael (1998), “Profitability under an Open versus
a Closed System”, Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 7(2):307-326.
Klemperer, Paul (1995), “Competition when Consumers have
Switching Costs”, Review of Economic Studies 62(4):515-
539.
Klemperer, Paul and Margaret Meyer (1989), “Supply Func-
tion Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty”, Econo-
metrica 57:1243-1277.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Scott Marcus, Patrick Rey and Jean
Tirole (2003), “Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-
Cost Pricing Principle”, Rand Journal of Economics 34(2):370-
390.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole (1998a),
“Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscrimina-
tory Pricing”, Rand Journal of Economics 29(1):1-37.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole (1998b),
“Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination”, Rand
Journal of Economics 29(1):38-56.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (2000), Competition
in Telecommunications, MIT Press.
Lerner, Josh and Jean Tirole (2004), “Efficient Patent Pools”,American
Economic Review 94:691-711.
Ma, Ching-To Albert (1997), “Option Contracts and Verti-
cal Foreclosure”, Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 6:725-753.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Michael D. Whinston (1986), “Free
Entry and Social Inefficiency”, Rand Journal of Economics
17(1):48-58.
89
Mathewson, G. Frank and Ralph Winter (1984), “An Eco-
nomic Theory of Vertical Restraints”, Rand Journal of
Economics 15(4):27—38.
Martimort, David (1996), “Exclusive Dealing, CommonAgency
and Multiprincipal Incentive Theory”, Rand Journal of
Economics 27(1):1-31
Martimort, David and Lars A. Stole (2003), “Contractual
Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria.” Advances
in Theoretical Economics, 3(1), Article 4.
Martin, Stephen, Hans-Theo Normann and Christopher Sny-
der (2001), “Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Mar-
kets”, Rand Journal of Economics 32:466-496.
Marx, Leslie and Greg Shaffer (2004), “Upfront Payments
and Exclusion in Downstream Markets”, mimeo.
Matutes, Carmen and Pierre Regibeau (1988), “Mix and
Match: Product Compatibility Without Network Exter-
nalities”, Rand Journal of Economics 19(2):219-234.
McAfee, R. Preston and Marius Schwartz (1994), “Oppor-
tunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrim-
ination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity”, American Economic
Review 84(1):210—230.
McAfee, R. Preston and Marius Schwartz (1995), “The Non-
Existence of Pairwise-proof Equilibrium”, Economics Let-
ters 49:251-259.
Mullin, Joseph and Wallace Mullin (1997), “United States
Steel’s Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore Proper-
ties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Gov-
ernance”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
74-100.
Nalebuff, Barry (2000), “Competing Against Bundles”, in
Peter Hammond and Gaerth Myles, eds, Incentives, Or-
ganization, and Public Economics, Oxford University Press.
90
Nalebuff, Barry (2003a), “Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Ef-
fects”, DTI Economics Paper No. 1, available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/economics/papers.html
Nalebuff, Barry (2003b), “Bundling and the GE-Honeywell
merger”, in John Kwoka and Lawrence White, eds,.The
Antitrust Revolution, 4th edition, Oxford University Press.
O’Brien, Daniel P. and Greg Shaffer (1992), “Vertical Control
with Bilateral Contracts”, Rand Journal of Economics
23(3):299—308.
Ordover, Janusz, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990),
“Equilibrium Market Foreclosure”, American Economic
Review 80:127—142.
Ordover, Janusz A., Alan O. Sykes and Robert D. Willig
(1985), “Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Domi-
nant Firms Toward the Producers of Complementary Prod-
ucts”, Antitrust and Regulation: Essays in Memory of
John J. McGowan, F. M. Fisher ed., MIT Press.
Perry, Martin K. (1989), “Vertical Integration: Determinants
and Effects”, in Richard. Schmalensee and Robert Willig,
eds, Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. I (North
Holland, Amsterdam).
Perry, Martin K. and Robert H. Porter (1989), “Can Re-
sale Price Maintenance and Franchise Fees Correct Sub-
optimal Levels of Retail Service?”, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 8(1):115—41.
Posner, Richard (1976), Antitrust Law, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Rasmusen, Eric B., J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley
(1991), “Naked Exclusion”, American Economic Review
81: 1137-1145.
91
Rey, Patrick, Jeanine Thal and Thibaud Vergé (2005), “Slot-
ting Allowances and Conditional Payments”, mimeo, Uni-
versité de Toulouse.
Rey, Patrick and Thibaud Vergé (2002), “RPM and horizon-
tal cartels”, CMPO Working Papers Series No. 02/047,
available at http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp47.pdf
Rey, Patrick and Thibaud Vergé (2004), “Bilateral Control
with Vertical Contracts”, Rand Journal of Economics
35(4):728-746
Riordan, Michael H. (1998), “Anticompetitive Vertical Inte-
gration by a Dominant Firm”, American Economic Re-
view 88(5):1232-48.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2003), “PlatformCom-
petition in Two-Sided Markets”, Journal of the European
Economic Association 1:990-1029.
Roth, Alvin E., Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara
and Shmuel Zamir (1991), “Bargaining and Market Be-
havior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo:
An Experimental Study”, American Economic Review
81:1068-1095.
Rust, John (1986), “When is it Optimal to Kill Off the Mar-
ket for Used Durable Goods”, Econometrica 54:65-86.
Salinger, Michael A. (1988), “Vertical Mergers and Mar-
ket Foreclosure”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
77:345—356.
Salop, Steven C. (1979), “Monopolistic Competition with
Outside Goods”, Bell Journal of Economics, 10:141-156.
Schmalensee, Richard (1973), “A Note on the Theory of Ver-
tical Integration”, Journal of Political Economy 81:442-
449.
92
Schwartz, Marius. and Gregory Werden (1996), “A Quality-
Signaling Rationale for Aftermarket Tying”, Antitrust
Law Journal 64:387-404.
Segal, Ilya (1999), “Contracting with Externalities”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2):337-388.
Segal, Ilya, and Michael D. Whinston (2000),“Naked Exclu-
sion: Comment”, American Economic Review 90(1):296-
309.
Segal, Ilya andMichael D. Whinston (2003), “Robust Predic-
tions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities”, Econo-
metrica 71(3):757-791.
Shapiro, Carl (1995), “Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare:
Making Sense of Kodak”, Antitrust Law Journal 63:483—
511.
Shepard, Andrea (1987), “Licensing to Enhance Demand for
NewTechnologies”, Rand Journal of Economics 18(3):360—
368.
Slade, Margaret E. (1998), “Beer and the Tie: Did Divesti-
ture of Brewer-owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Prices?”,
The Economic Journal 108:565-602.
Snyder, Christopher M. (1994), “Vertical Foreclosure in the
British Beer Industry”, in Buyers, Suppliers, Competi-
tors: The Interaction between a Firm’s Horizontal and
Vertical Relationship, PhD Thesis, Department of eco-
nomics, MIT.
Snyder, Christopher M. (1995a), “Empirical Studies of Verti-
cal Foreclosure”, Industry Economics Conference Papers
and Proceedings, University of Melbourne and Bureau of
Industry Economics, 95/23:98-127.
Snyder, Christopher M. (1995b), “Interfirm Effects of Verti-
cal Integration: Event Studies of the US Oil Industry”,
mimeo, George Washington University.
93
Spier, Kathryn E. and Michael D. Whinston (1995), “On the
Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of
Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation”,
Rand Journal of Economics 26:180—202.
Stahl, Dale O. (1988), “Bertrand Competition for Inputs and
Walrasian Outcomes”, American Economic Review.78:189-
201.
Stefanadis, Christodoulos (1997), “DownstreamVertical Fore-
closure and Upstream Innovation”, Journal of Industrial
Economics 65:445-456.
Stole, Lars A. (2003), “Price Discrimination in Competitive
Environments”, in M. Armstrong and Robert S. Porter,
eds, Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. III (North-
Holland, Amsterdam).
Stole, Lars A. and Jeffrey Zwiebel (1996), “Intra-Firm Bar-
gaining Under Non-binding Contracts”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 63:375-410.
(2003), “Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments”,
in M. Armstrong and Robert S. Porter, eds, Handbook of
Industrial Organization, vol. III (North-Holland, Amster-
dam).
Su, Teddy T. (1975), “Durability of Consumption Goods Re-
considered”, American Economic Review 65:148-157.
Tirole, Jean (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization,
MIT Press.
Tirole, Jean (2005), “The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer”,
Competition Policy International 1:1-25.
Vernon, John M. and Daniel A. Graham (1974), “Profitabil-
ity of Monopolization by Vertical Integration”, Journal
of Political Economy 79:924-925.
94
Vickers, John (1995), “Competition and Regulation in Ver-
tically Related Markets”, Review of Economic Studies
62:1—18.
Vickers, John (1996), “Market Power and Inefficiency: A
Contracts Perspective”, Oxford Review of Economic Pol-
icy, 12:11-26.
Warren-Boulton, Frederick R. (1974), “Vertical Control with
Variable Proportions”, Journal of Political Economy 82:783-
802.
Whinston, Michael D. (1990), “Tying, Foreclosure, and Ex-
clusion”, American Economic Review 80:837—860.
Whinston, Michael D. (2001), “Exclusivity and Tying in U.S.
v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know”, Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 15:63-80.
White, Lucy (2000), “Foreclosure with Incomplete Informa-
tion”, mimeo, Oxford University and University of Toulouse.
Yanelle, Marie-Odile (1997), “Banking Competition andMar-
ket Efficiency”, Review of Economic Studies.64:215-239.
95
APPENDIX
A Private incentives not to exclude
Section 2 emphasized the bottleneck owner’s incentive to use various
foreclosure strategies to preserve its market power. This section inves-
tigates whether the foreclosure activity can backfire on the bottleneck
owner.
A.1 The protection of downstream specific invest-
ment: The 1995 AT&T divestiture
Interestingly, the foreclosure logic implies that a bottleneck owner may
in some circumstances want to refrain from integrating vertically. To un-
derstand this, recall that under vertical integration, the excluded rivals
on the competitive segment suffer a secondary line injury. Anticipat-
ing this, they may refrain from investing in assets that are specific to
their relationship with the bottleneck owner, as these have low value if
their firms have limited access to the essential input. This in turn may
hurt the upstream bottleneck, which has a smaller industrial base down-
stream. And the independent downstream firms may start investing in
assets that are specific to other upstream firms (Uˆ) rather than to the
bottleneck (U).
These ideas shed light on AT&T’s 1995 voluntary divestiture of its
manufacturing arm, AT&T Technology (now Lucent). One must recall
that until then, AT&T and the RBOCs, who are major purchasers of
AT&T made equipment, hardly competed in the final good markets.
With AT&T’s slow entry into the Intralata and the local telecommu-
nications markets and with the 1996 Telecommunication Act allowing
the RBOCs to enter the long distance market (provided that local loop
competition developed sufficiently), competition between AT&T and the
RBOCs on the final good markets was likely to become substantial. Con-
sequently, the RBOCs may have been concerned about a possible fore-
closure by AT&T Technology whenever such exclusion would favor the
telecommunication branch of AT&T. There was thus a possibility that
in a situation of vertical integration and increased product competition,
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the RBOCs would have turned more and more to alternative and non
vertically integrated manufacturers such as Northern Telecom, Alcatel,
Siemens, or the Japanese manufacturers. The very threat of foreclo-
sure could have substantially hurt AT&T’s manufacturing arm, with
the short-term gain from foreclosure more than offset by a long-term
loss of manufacturing market share.
Let us formalize this argument in an extended version of the foreclo-
sure model of Section 2. There are two upstream firms (manufacturers):
U with unit cost c, and Uˆ with unit cost cˆ > c ; U can be thought of
as being AT&T Technology and Uˆ as being a rival manufacturer, since
we will be primarily interested in those segments in which AT&T Tech-
nology had some competitive advantage and therefore foreclosure may
occur. There are two downstream firms D1 and D2, both with unit cost
0; we will think of D1 as being the telecommunications services branch
of AT&T and D2 as being the RBOCs. Last, there are two markets:
market A (long distance) and market B (local).
Recall our basic argument: The integrated firm U − D1 may want
to divest when the competition between D1 and D2 gets more intense
because D2 then becomes more concerned about foreclosure and wants
to sever or at least limit its relationship with U . We model this idea
in an very simple albeit extreme way: We start from a situation of
line-of-business restrictions in which D1 is in market A only and D2 is
in market B only. Then line-of-business restrictions are lifted and D1
and D2 compete head-to-head in both markets. To formalize the idea
that D2 makes technological decisions (choice of standard, learning by
using, etc.) that will in the future make purchases from U or Uˆ more
desirable, we assume that ex ante D2 makes a costless, but irreversible
choice between U and Uˆ . That is, ex post D2 can purchase from a single
supplier. This assumption is much stronger than needed, but models the
basic idea in a very straightforward way. We also assume, without loss
of generality, that D1 picks U as its supplier.
The timing is as follows:
• Stage 1: U and D1 decide whether they stay integrated or split.
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• Stage 2: D2 makes a technological choice that determines its sup-
plier (U or Uˆ).
• Stage 3: U and D1 secretly agree on a tariff T1(·). Simultaneously
and also secretly, with probability α, the supplier chosen by D2 at
stage 2 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer T2(·) to D2; with probabil-
ity 1−α, D2 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer T2(·) to this supplier.
Then, the downstream firms order quantities from their suppliers
and pay according to the agreed upon tariffs.
• Stage 4: D1 and D2 transform the intermediate product into the
final goods. In case of line-of-business restrictions, each down-
stream firm sells the output in its own turf (markets A and B,
respectively). In case of head-to-head competition, D1 and D2 ob-
serve each other’s output in each market and set their prices for
the final good in each market.
This timing calls for some comments. The last two stages are stan-
dard, except that we here have two final markets. Also, we introduce a
more evenly distributed bargaining power: D2 obtains on average a frac-
tion 1−α of the profit made in its relationship with the selected supplier
(the same can be assumed for D1, but this is irrelevant). We had earlier
assumed that α = 1, so D2 never made any profit when facing a single
supplier; we could maintain this assumption but find it more elegant to
introduce some sharing of profit so that D2 not be indifferent as to its
choice of technology at stage 2.
We now analyze this game.
• Line-of-business restrictions.
Under line-of-business restrictions, D1 and D2 are monopolists in
their respective markets. At stage 2, D2 selects U as its supplier, as
(1− α)πmB (c) > (1− α)πmB (cˆ),
where πmB (c˜) is the monopoly profit in market B for unit cost c˜. Thus,
the RBOCs turn to AT&T Technology if the latter has a competitive
advantage.
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Note also that, under line-of-business restrictions, vertical integration
between U and D1 has no impact on markets as foreclosure is not an
issue.111
• Head-to-head competition.
Let us now assume that D1 and D2 are in both markets. If U and D1
are vertically integrated, then from section 2.2, we know that ifD2 selects
U at stage 2, D2 is completely foreclosed from both downstream markets
at stage 3. It then makes zero profit. By contrast, when selecting the
inefficient supplier Uˆ , D2 makes a strictly positive profit as long as Uˆ is
not too inefficient, that is as long as cˆ is below the monopoly price for
cost c in at least one of the markets. This formalizes the notion that
the nonintegrated downstream firm is likely to switch supplier when
competition is introduced and the former supplier remains vertically
integrated. Note that such switching generates production inefficiency.
Let πCi (c, cˆ) denote the Cournot profit in market i = A,B of a firm
with marginal cost c facing a firm with marginal cost cˆ; and let
πC(c, cˆ) ≡ πCA(c, cˆ) + πCB(c, cˆ)
be the overall profit.112 This is the profit made by the integrated firm
U −D1 under head-to-head competition.
Let us now assume vertical separation of U and D1. Then, for the
same reason as under line-of-business restrictions, D2 selects U at stage
2 as:
(1− α)πC(c, c) > (1− α)πC(cˆ, c).
The aggregate profit of U and D1 is then (1 + α)πC(c, c). We thus
conclude that it is in the interest of U and D1 to split if and only if:
(1 + α)πC(c, c) > πC(c, cˆ).
This condition admits a simple interpretation: Vertical integration re-
sults in foreclosure and in a flight of the nonintegrated firm to the rival
manufacturer. Foreclosure has a beneficial impact on the merging firms’
111A U − D1 merger could however be motivated by (unmodelled) efficiency con-
siderations.
112πCi (c, cˆ) should be replaced with π
m
i (c) if cˆ ≥ pmi (c).
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profit but the loss of a downstream consumer is costly if U has some
bargaining power in negotiations, that is if α > 0. For cˆ large, the fore-
closure effect dominates;113 conversely, the smaller-customer-base effect
dominates for cˆ close to c. More generally, strong downstream competi-
tion (e.g., from the removal of line-of-business restrictions) and/or weak
upstream competition make foreclosure, and thus vertical integration,
more attractive.114
A.2 Protecting upstream investment through down-
stream competition
Chemla (2003) develops the (Williamsonian) argument that downstream
competition protects the bottleneck’s investment against expropriation
in a situation in which the downstream firms have nonnegligible bargain-
ing power. There is then a general tradeoff between foreclosing com-
petition downstream so as to exploit monopoly power and preserving
competition there in order to protect upstream rents.
The thrust of his analysis is as follows: A bottleneck owner U faces
n identical downstream firms D1, · · · , Dn. Consider the Cournot set up
of Section 2, except that the bargaining power is split more evenly:
• Stage 1: U picks the number of downstream firms m ≤ n that are
potentially active later on. For example, it communicates its tech-
nical specifications to m firms and these specifications are indis-
113For example, if cˆ ≥ max(pmA (c), pmB (c)), then πC(c, cˆ) = πm(c) = πmA (c)+πmB (c) >
2πC(c, c).
114We have assumed that D2 has the same bargaining power (1−α) vis-à-vis U and
Uˆ . A new effect appears if D2 has more bargaining power with Uˆ , say because Uˆ is
competitive, than with U . Then, due to differential bargaining positions, under head-
to-head competition a divestiture may not suffice for U to keep D2 as a customer.
For example, if Uˆ is a competitive fringe producing at cost cˆ, D2 buys from an
unintegrated U if and only if (1− α)πC(c, c) > πC(cˆ, c) It is easy to show that there
exists α such that it is optimal for U −D1 to divest (for that α) if and only if
2πC(c, c) > πC(c, cˆ) + πC(cˆ, c).
This condition is the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of franchise-
fee (or royalty-free) licensing in a Cournot duopoly (the firm with cost c licenses its
technology to its rival with initial cost cˆ for a franchise fee). It holds if cˆ is close to c
and does not hold for large cˆ’s (Katz and Shapiro (1985)), a conclusion in line with
that obtained in the text.
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pensable due to compatibility requirements. Without these spec-
ifications a downstream firm starts development “too late” and
cannot compete at stages 2 and 3.
• Stage 2: With probability α, U makes secret take-it-or-leave-it
offers Ti(·) to each Di (in the subgroup selected at stage 1). With
probability 1−α, all Di’s make (separate) take-it-or-leave-it offers
Ti(·) to U . Di then orders a quantity of intermediate product qi
and pays Ti(qi) accordingly.
• Stage 3: TheDi’s that were selected at stage 1 transform the inter-
mediate product into the final good, observe each other’s output
and set their prices for the final good.
Chemla further assumes that the bottleneck’s cost C(Q) is strictly
convex rather than linear. The role of this assumption will become ap-
parent shortly. The intuition for his results can be grasped from looking
at the two polar cases of bargaining power. When α = 1, the bottle-
neck has the entire bargaining power, and is only limited by the Coasian
commitment problem. To commit not to supply beyond the monopoly
output at stage 2, U optimally selects m = 1, that is forecloses the mar-
ket. When α = 0, the downstream firms have all the bargaining power.
Under linear costs, they would entirely extract the bottleneck’s rent at
stage 2. This is not so under decreasing returns to scale in the provision
of the essential input, as long as m ≥ 2. In order for an offer by Di to be
accepted by U , Di’s payment must be at least equal to the incremental
cost of qi, and therefore each downstream firm must pay its incremental
cost (close to the marginal cost for m large), leaving a rent to the bot-
tleneck owner (as inframarginal costs are lower than incremental costs
under decreasing returns to scale). Thus a bottleneck owner may not
want to engage in exclusionary practices when contracts are incomplete,
in the sense that the bottleneck owner cannot contract on price when
selecting the number m of buyers, and when the bottleneck owner has
limited bargaining power against the remaining buyers of the essential
input.
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In this bargaining power story the upstream bottleneck has a moti-
vation not to foreclose, namely the transfer of bargaining power. But
this motivation is unrelated to social concerns, and it has actually too
little incentive from a social viewpoint not to foreclose. Chemla also
considers a second variation of the basic framework, in which U chooses
some noncontractible investment e in marketing or design, that shifts
the demand curve p = P (Q, e) upwards: ∂P/∂e > 0. This industry
specific investment is chosen between stage 1 and stage 2 in the timing
above and is observed by the downstream firms. Picking m > 1 protects
somewhat the upstream firm against expropriation of the benefits of
its investment when bargaining power lies downstream. That is, down-
stream competition at stage 2 gives the bottleneck owner an incentive
to invest that would not exist if there were a single downstream firm
(m = 1) that would impose a payment exactly equal to the bottleneck
cost. Chemla shows that the bottleneck investment increases with the
number of competing downstream firms m. This gives the upstream
bottleneck a second incentive not to foreclose, which fits with the social
concern of protecting investments.
B Excessive entry and vertical foreclosure
As mentioned in section 5, foreclosure may have the merit of limiting
entry in situations where entry would otherwise be excessive. We briefly
analyze this potential benefit in the context of vertical foreclosure. Con-
sider our basic framework, except that there is now a large number of
potential competitors, D1, D2, ..., for the production of the downstream
good, and that in the first stage, after U ’s contract offer, each down-
stream firm Di chooses whether to enter (and accept the contract), in
which case it has to pay a fixed cost f . [This fixed cost is a technologi-
cal production cost and does not include the fixed fee associated with a
two-part tariff for the intermediate good.]
All downstream firms produce the same homogenous good, so that
efficiency would dictate only one downstream entrant. To capture the
risk of excessive entry, we further suppose that each Di does not observe
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its competitors’ entry decisions.115 Under passive conjectures, U then
offers each Di an efficient bilateral contract, which can be thought of as
a two-part tariff with a marginal access price equal to marginal cost c.
Let us denote by πC (n) andQC(n) = nqC(n) the per firm gross profit
and the total output in the standard (Cournot) oligopolistic equilibrium
with n active firms:
πc(n) = max
q
{[P ((n− 1)qC(n) + q)− c]q}.
And let us define:
πˆ(n) = max
q
{[P (QC(n) + q)− c]q}.
In words, πˆ(n) is the maximum profit gross of the fixed cost that a non-
entering downstream could obtain if it entered, assuming that there are
already n active firms, offering the output corresponding to the stan-
dard n-firm oligopolistic equilibrium. The functions πC(·) and πˆC(·) are
decreasing.
In the absence of vertical integration, a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for an equilibrium with n active downstream firms is:
πC (n) ≥ f ≥ bπ (n) .
There may be several such equilibria. The optimal number of entrants for
the industry, i.e. for U who in equilibrium recovers all profits through
the fixed fee, maximizes total Cournot net profit n[πC(n) − f ] in the
relevant range defined above. Since total Cournot gross profit, nπC(n), is
decreasing in n, so is total Cournot net profit. So the industry optimum
has nb entrants such that πˆ (nb) = f, and the lowest industry profit is
reached for nw entrants such that πC (nw) = f ; this latter equilibrium
corresponds to the standard free entry equilibrium and yields zero profit
to all firms.
Under vertical integration, U forecloses the downstream market. As
a result the number of active downstream firms is equal to the one that
115If entry were observable and contracts made contingent on the number of active
firms, then U could perfectly monitor the number of active firms and achieve the
entire monopolization of the industry by allowing only one active firm downstream.
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is desirable from the point of view of productive efficiency (ni = 1), but
the price is the monopoly one. For example, in the linear demand case
( P (Q) = d − Q), nw = (d− c) /
√
f − 1, nb = (d− c) /2
√
f − 1, and
QC (n) = (n/ (n+ 1)) (d− c). If in the absence of foreclosure the firms
end up in the “worst” equilibrium (from their point of view, but also
from the point of view of the duplication of fixed costs), then foreclosure
is socially desirable when the parameter (d− c) /
√
f lies between 2 and
6.
C Vertical foreclosure with Bertrand downstream
competition
In the vertical foreclosure framework of Section 2, downstream com-
petition was modelled in a Cournot, or more precisely in a Bertrand-
Edgeworth way. It should however be clear that the commitment prob-
lem described above is robust to the nature of downstream competi-
tion. This Appendix notes however that a formalization “à la Bertrand”
rather than “à la Bertrand-Edgeworth” is by no means straightforward
and has not been properly addressed in the literature. With Bertrand
competition, the marginal price charged to one downstream firm directly
affects the profitability of the contracts signed with its competitors. Pas-
sive beliefs (which, recall, are the natural conjectures in the Bertrand-
Edgeworth timing) thus appear less plausible, since downstream firms
should anticipate that, if the supplier deviates with one of them, it has an
incentive to change the contracts offered to the others. In addition, there
may exist no equilibrium with passive beliefs, because the gain from a
multilateral deviation may now exceed the total gains of the unilateral
deviations.
To study this existence problem, let us assume that downstream firms
produce differentiated goods, with symmetric final demandsDi(p1, p2) =
D(pi, pj), and change the timing as follows:
• Stage 1: U secretly offers each Di a tariff Ti(qi).
• Stage 2: D1 and D2 simultaneously set their prices, p1 and p2, and
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then order q1 and q2 so as to satisfy demand (consumers observe
both prices and choose freely between D1 and D2).
Assuming passive conjectures, Di expects Dj to set the same equi-
librium price pj, regardless of the contract Di is offered by U . Hence,
given this expected price pj, when facing a tariff Ti(qi), Di chooses pi
so as to maximize piD(pi , pj)− Ti(D(pi , pj)). Assume that U can only
charge two-part tariffs:
Ti(qi) = Fi + wiqi.
Di’s first-order condition is:
(pi − wi)∂1D(pi, pj) +D(pi, pj) = 0, (1)
which defines a reaction function R˜B(pj ; wi) that is increasing in wi
(“B” stands for “Bertrand competition”). Given the candidate equilib-
rium price pj , U will then “choose” Di’s price so as to maximize their
aggregate profit:
(pi − c)D(pi, pj) + (wj − c)D(pj, pi).
This price pi is characterized by:
(pi − c)∂1D(pi, pj) +D(pi, pj) + (wj − c)∂2D(pj, pi) = 0. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) yields:
(wi − c)∂1D(·) + (wj − c)∂2D(·) = 0. (3)
Conditions (3), where ∂iD(·) is evaluated at the Nash equilibrium re-
tail prices, provide a system of two equations with two unknowns, the
wholesale prices. A full rank argument then implies w1 = w2 = c : The
equilibrium marginal transfer price equals the marginal cost. This in
turn implies that a candidate equilibrium (for passive conjectures) must
yield the Bertrand price and profit (with RB(p) ≡ R˜B(p; c)):
p1= p2 = pB < pm such that pB ≡ RB(pB)
πU =2πB < πm.
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The reader may find this result, due to O’Brien and Shaffer (1992),116
surprising for the following reason. The presumption under passive con-
jectures is that the downstream competitors wage whatever form of
competition is relevant, internalizing exactly the marginal cost of up-
stream production. There is an extra twist under Bertrand competition,
though: Because orders lag price setting, a change in the wholesale price
wi charged to a downstream competitor i affects its final price pi and
thus the profit (wj−c)D(pj, pi) made on downstream competitor j. But
this indirect effect (which does not exist when orders are placed before
demand is realized) vanishes exactly when wi = c, that is when the
wholesale price is equal to marginal cost.
Let us now show that, if demands are symmetric and the cross-price
elasticity is at least one half of the own-price elasticity, there exists no
passive conjectures equilibrium. [Note that in the Hotelling case, the
cross-price elasticity is equal to the own-price elasticity at a symmetric
equilibrium. More generally what is needed for the reasoning below is
that there is enough substitutability between the two products.]
With passive conjectures, the upstream firm’s profit can be written
as πi(wi, wj) + πj(wj, wi) where
πi(wi, wj) = (pri (wi)− wi)D (pri (wi), pj) + (wi − c)D
¡
pri (wi), p
r
j(wj)
¢
,
and πj is defined analogously. Fixing anticipated equilibrium prices (this
is the passive conjectures assumption), pri (wi) is defined by
pri (wi) = argmax(pi − wi)D(pi, pej).
Using the first-order condition for pri (·), it is easy to show that at the
candidate equilibrium (wi = c),
∂2πi
∂w2i
=
∂Di
∂pi
dpri
dwi
,
∂2πi
∂wi∂wj
=
∂Di
∂pj
dprj
dwj
,
∂2πi
∂w2j
= 0.
And so, the Hessian of πi + πj is semi-definite negative only if
−∂D
i
∂pi
> 2
∂Di
∂pj
116They moreover show that the Bertrand equilibrium is still the unique candidate
equilibrium, even when U can offer general nonlinear tariffs.
106
(using the symmetry of the candidate equilibrium). Thus, if the cross-
price elasticity is at least half of the own-price elasticity, U ’s above profit
is not locally concave, implying that there exists a profitable multilateral
deviation; therefore, there exists no passive conjectures equilibrium.
To circumvent this existence problem, Rey and Vergé (2004) con-
sider the notion of wary beliefs introduced by McAfee-Schwartz, where
a downstream firm that receives an unexpected offer then anticipates
that the supplier acts optimally with its rivals, given the offer just re-
ceived. In the context of linear model, Rey and Vergé show that wary
beliefs equilibria exist even when passive beliefs equilibria fail to exist,
and these equilibria exhibit some degree of opportunism: the upstream
firm does not fully exploit its market power, although it performs better
than when downstream firms have passive beliefs.
• Vertical integration
Let us now assume that U and D1 merge. The thorny issue of con-
jectures no longer arises since the nonintegrated unit then knows that
the integrated one purchases at marginal cost, and by construction the
integrated downstream firm knows the tariff offered to the other one.
Through the choice of the marginal transfer price to D2, w2, U gen-
erates for D2 a response to its expected price pe1 given by:
pr2(w2; p
e
1) = argmaxp2
(p2 − w2)D(p2, pe1).
[This is the same reaction curve as previously, but we now explicit the
rival’s expected price.]
Conversely, given a transfer price w2 and an expected retail price pe2,
U −D1’s optimal response is given by:
pr1(w2; p
e
2) = argmaxp1
{(p1 − c)D(p1, pe2) + (w2 − c)D(pe2, p1)} .
Hence, a marginal transfer price w2 generates a conditional equilibrium
(pˆ1(w2), pˆ2(w2)) given by: p1 = pr1(w2; p2) and p2 = pr2(w2; p1). The
optimal transfer price then maximizes
(pˆ1(w2)− c)D (pˆ1(w2), pˆ2(w2)) + (pˆ2(w2)− c)D (pˆ2(w2), pˆ1(w2)) .
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Assuming the retail prices are strategic complements, both pˆ1 and pˆ2
increase with w2. Moreover, the curve F ≡ (pˆ1(w2), pˆ2(w2))w2 of feasible
price pairs goes through the Bertrand equilibrium point (for w2 = c),
and never crosses the curve p1 = Rm(p2).117 Moreover, as w2 goes to+∞
(which amounts to exclusive dealing with D1), p2(w2) goes to +∞ too
(since p2(w2) > w2). Hence the curve F crosses the curve p2 = Rm2 (p1)
to the left of the monopoly point M (see Figure 6).
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It is clear that, starting fromB (w2 = c), a small increase inw2, which
increases both prices pˆ1 and pˆ2, strictly increases U − D1’s aggregate
117p1(w2) = Rm(p2(w2)) ≡ argmaxp1(p1 − c)D(p1, p2(w2)) + (p2(w2) −
c)D(p2(w2), p1) would require p2(w2) = w2, which is impossible.
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profit. Hence vertical integration yields w2 > c. The point I which
represents the optimal pair of prices (p∗1, p∗2) actually lies above the curve
p2 = Rm(p1). To see this, evaluate the impact of a slight increase in w2,
starting from the value w2 such that pˆ2 = Rm(pˆ1(w2)):
d
dw2
((pˆ1(w2)− c)D(pˆ1(w2), pˆ2(w2)) + (pˆ2(w2)− c)D(pˆ2(w2), pˆ1(w2)))
= ddw2 ((pˆ1(w2)− c)D(pˆ1(w2), p2) + (p2 − c)D(p2, pˆ1(w2)))
¯¯¯
p2=pˆ2(w2)
= (pˆ2(w2)− w2)D2(pˆ2(w2), pˆ1(w2)) dpˆ1dw2 > 0,
where the first equality stems from pˆ2 = Rm(pˆ1). Note finally that
the equilibrium prices satisfy w2 > c and p∗2 > p∗1 (since I lies to the
right of p1 = Rm(p2) and above p2 = Rm(p1).) In that sense, vertical
integration does lead to foreclosure: The unintegrated firm D2 faces
a higher marginal transfer price and sets a higher price than its rival.
Foreclosure in general is incomplete, however, when the two downstream
firms are differentiated: In that case, vertical integration yields more
profit than exclusive dealing (which would correspond here to w2 =∞).
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